Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth by Bernstein, David E.
Junk Science in the United States
and the Commonwealth
David E. Bernstein t
I. INTRODUCTION .............................................. 124
II. THE AMERICAN LAW OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE .......................... 126
A. The Frye General Acceptance Test and Its Critics ..................... 127
B. The Emergence of the Reliability Test ............................. 129
C. The Evidentiary Challenge of Toxic Tort Litigation ..................... 130
D. The Revival of Frye ........................................ 132
E. The Supreme Court Enters the Fray ............................... 134
III. THE ADMiSSImrrY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CANADA, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND,
AND ENGLAND .............................................. 138
A. The Law of Scientific Evidence in Canada ........................... 139
1. The Frye Debate in Canada ................................ 140
2. The Canadian Supreme Court Adopts a Liberal Approach ............. 141
3. Lower Court Reaction .................................... 142
4. The Canadian Supreme Court's Latest Pronouncement on Scientific Evidence:
R. v. Mohan .. ....................................... 145
B. The Law of Scientific Evidence in Australia .......................... 148
1. The Misintroduction of the Frye General Acceptance Test Into Australia .... 149
2. The Effect of the Miscarriage of Justice Cases .................... 151
3. The Australian Law Reform Commission Report Favors a Relevancy Test ... 154
4. Strict Scrutiny Gains Momentum ............................ 155
5. The Australian Evidence Code .............................. 161
C. The Law of Scientific Evidence in New Zealand ....................... 162
1. Frye in New Zealand ................................... 163
2. Recent Developments in New Zealand .......................... 165
D. The Law of Scientific Evidence in England .......................... 166
1. English Law on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence .............. 166
2. Reforns of the Forensic Science System. ........................ 170
IV. LESSONS .................................................. 173
A. The Junk Science Problem is Real ................................ 173
B. Juries Are Not Competent to Decide Complex Scientific Issues ............. 174
C. Tightening the Rules for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Is a Second-Best
Solution to the Problem of Junk Science in Tort ....................... 178
D. Tightening the Rules for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Will Not Solve the
Junk Science Problem in Criminal Cases; Broader Reforms are Needed ........ 181
V. CONCLUSION ............................................... 182
t Assistant Professor, George Mason University School of Law; J.D. 1988, Yale Law School; B.A.
1994, Brandeis University. The author thanks Mark Aronson, Solveig Bernstein, Bert Black, Harold
Edgar, Ian Freckelton, Edward lmwinkelried, and John McGinnis for their comments. Tim Blake provided
helpful citations to New Zealand law. Portions of this article were presented to law faculty workshops in
April 1995 at the University of Melbourne, the University of New South Wales, the University of
Queensland, Sydney University, and Waikato University (N.Z.). The author researched this article while
serving as a Research Fellow in the Julius Silver Program in Law, Science & Technology at Columbia
University School of Law, generously sponsored by the Mellon Foundation.
124 YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:123
I. INTRODUCTION
At one time the use of forensic science in American criminal trials was
relatively rare. Since the mid-1970s, however, prosecutors have been using
a growing number of forensic techniques with ever greater frequency. The use
of scientific evidence in criminal cases has been controversial. Critics have
argued, with some success, that many forensic techniques are unreliable and
should be excluded from court.'
As controversy over the reliability of evidence based on forensic science
in criminal trials increased through the 1980s, an even more vociferous debate
arose over the alleged misuse of scientific evidence in toxic tort litigation.
Toxic tort cases involve allegations of injury from exposure to environmental
pollutants or pharmaceuticals. Once quite rare, these cases became relatively
commonplace by the early 1980s.2 Soon thereafter, critics began to express
skepticism regarding the evidence relied upon by plaintiffs in many of these
cases. By the early 1990s, prominent critics such as Bert Black,3 Peter
Huber,4 and even then-Vice President Dan Quayle5 were arguing that
plaintiffs' attorneys often misused scientific evidence in toxic tort cases.
Huber popularized the phrase "junk science" as a description of scientific
evidence that is either inherently unreliable, or that is being stretched well
beyond its limitations. Plaintiffs' attorneys and their defenders, meanwhile,
argued that Huber and other critics were wildly overstating the junk science
problem, if it existed at all.
Some legal scholars, editorialists, and others argued that juries must be
1. For recent criticism of forensic science evidence, see, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility
ofLaboratory Reports in Criminal Trials: The Reliability of Scientific Proof, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 671 (1988);
Paul C. Giannelli, 'Junk Science: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105 (1993);
Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Needfor Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH, 109 (1991);
Andre A. Moenssens, Novel Scientific Evidence in Criminal Cases: Some Words of Caution, 84 J. CRIM.
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1993); Michael J. Saks, Implications of the Daubert Testfor Forensic Identification
Science, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sci. EVIDENCE Q. 427 (1994). These articles cite other works criticizing
forensic science evidence over the last two decades.
Voiceprint evidence is an example of forensic science evidence that flourished in the mid-1970s until
criticism led to its almost universal exclusion. Prosecutors gradually stopped offering voiceprint evidence
after a panel appointed by the National Academy of Sciences concluded that the reported scientific results
showed that the accuracy of voice identifications did not improve when voice spectrograms are used.
COMM. ON EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ON THE THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION (1979). The report added that there is no "solid theoretical basis of
answers to scientific questions concerning the foundations of voice identification. This disparity between
practice and theory appears to be recognized by practitioners and scientists involved in the field of voice
identification." Id. at 10.
Other techniques, such as forensic hair analysis, have survived criticism. Recently, however, a
federal district court rejected evidence based on hair comparison, finding that it was not scientifically valid.
Williamson v. Reynolds, No. CIV. 94-539-S, 1995 WL 558566, at *29 (E.D. Okla. Sept. 19, 1995); see
also Edward J. Imwinkelried, Forensic HairAnalysis: The CaseAgainst the Underemployment of Scientific
Evidence, 39 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 41, 44 (1982) (noting that forensic hair analysis has been found to
have very high rate of error).
2. See Robert F. Blomquist, American Toxic Tort Law: An Historical Background, 1979-87, 10
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 85 (1992) (discussing rise of toxic tort litigation in 1980s).
3. Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595 (1988).
4. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1991).
5. Dan Quayle, CivilJustice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559, 565-66 (1992); Dan Quayle, Address
Before the American Bar Association, Aug. 13, 1991, available in LEXIS, Fednew File.
protected from the scourge of junk science. Like-minded judges began to
scrutinize scientific evidence closely before admitting it at trial and to exclude
evidence that did not meet their strict standards. Other judges were content to
rely on the adversarial system to-reveal any flaws in tendered scientific
evidence. These judges favored admitting any scientific evidence that seemed
relevant, and therefore rarely excluded scientific evidence before trial.
The debate over the proper standards for the admissibility of scientific
evidence reached the United States Supreme Court in 1993 in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals.6 The Court essentially adopted a rather strict
reliability test, but the opinion was not sufficiently conclusive to end the
controversy.
While the junk science debate has raged in the United States, a similar
debate has simmered in several other common law jurisdictions. Legal
scholars and judges in England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand have
been struggling with the issue of what standards they should use in deciding
whether to admit expert scientific testimony. Because of the wealth of U.S.
commentary and precedent on the admissibility of scientific evidence, the
American debate has often spilled over to the Commonwealth.7
Commonwealth courts and commentators frequently cite U.S. sources to
justify their positions regarding scientific evidence.
American commentators, however, have almost completely ignored legal
and intellectual developments regarding scientific evidence in the
Commonwealth. Of the hundreds of American law review articles that discuss
scientific evidence, not a single one has a comparative focus. Indeed, these
articles rarely cite any cases concerning scientific evidence from jurisdictions
outside the United States.
One unfortunate consequence of the failure of Americans to take note of
the growing controversy in the Commonwealth over scientific evidence is that
Commonwealth courts and commentators are incorporating U.S. precedent
and theory into their debate without any explanatory assistance or constructive
criticism from Americans. This lack of American participation is problematic
because even under the best of circumstances, the law in the United States is
notoriously difficult for outsiders to master due to the many federal and state
jurisdictions, each of which has its own case law. This problem is aggravated
in the context of the admissibility of scientific evidence' because there is an
especially large number of cases on the subject, along with dozens of articles
offering (frequently contradictory) commentary. 9
As a necessary prelude to discussing the law of scientific evidence in the
Commonwealth, which has been influenced by American law, this Article
6. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
7. I use "Commonwealth" in this Article to refer to England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.
What this definition lacks in inclusiveness it makes up for in brevity. The vast majority of Commonwealth
cases and commentary regarding scientific evidence is a product of these four countries.
8. I suspect that another difficulty facing Commonwealth courts and scholars trying to apprehend
American law is that trends in judicial decisions tend to change far more rapidly in the United States than
in other common law nations, where respect for precedent is far greater. Because this particular
idiosyncracy of American law is not widely recognized abroad, Commonwealth courts have sometimes
relied on outdated articles or cases, mistaking them to be Current U.S. thinking on scientific evidence.
9. For an example of conflicting commentary on Daubert, see infra text accompanying notes 377-78.
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begins with a discussion of the development of the rules regarding the
admissibility of scientific evidence in the United Siates from 1923 to the
present.
Next, this Article discusses the emerging controversy over scientific
evidence in the Commonwealth. The novelty and importance of the discussion
is threefold. First, it will serve as a unique reference for scholars exploring
the debate over the rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence in various
jurisdictions. There have been quite a few articles in Commonwealth
publications discussing scientific evidence over the past few years, and many
of them take a comparative law approach. To date, however, no book or
article has comprehensively pulled together all of the relevant case law and
commentary. This Article fills that void.
Second, this Article is the first to discuss the Commonwealth debate over
scientific evidence from an American perspective. The Article examines how
American law is being used and often misused in the Commonwealth.
The third unique feature of this Article is that it attempts to draw
conclusions relevant to the American junk science debate by studying the
development of the law of scientific evidence in the Commonwealth. The
Article discusses the following lessons that Americans could learn from the
Commonwealth debate: (1) the junk science problem is real; (2) juries are not
competent to decide complex scientific issues; (3) tightening the rules for the
admissibility of scientific evidence is a second best solution to the problem of
junk science in tort; and (4) tightening the rules for the admissibility of
scientific evidence will not solve the junk science problem in criminal cases -
broader reforms are needed.
Thus, Part I of this Article discusses the development of the rules for the
admissibility of scientific evidence in the United States. Part II discusses the
admissibility rules in Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and England, with
particular attention paid to the influence of American law in those countries.
Part III reviews what Americans can learn from the Commonwealth debate
over junk science. The Article concludes by applauding the general trend
toward stricter scrutiny of scientific evidence.
II. THE AMERICAN LAW OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
The development of modern American law governing the admissibility of
scientific evidence began in 1923 with the introduction of the Frye general
acceptance test.' 0 Since then, American judges and scholars have debated
whether the admissibility of scientific theories or techniques should be
determined by a liberal "relevancy" test focusing mainly on the qualifications
of the expert, the more conservative Frye general acceptance test, or a flexible
reliability test focusing on whether the expert's testimony is based on proper
scientific methodology and reasoning. In 1993, the United States Supreme
Court issued its first ruling on scientific evidence in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals." The Court rejected both the Frye test and the liberal
10. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
11. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
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relevancy test in favor of a flexible reliability test,12 the exact parameters of
which have been a matter of debate. The Frye test, meanwhile, lives on in
many state courts.
A. The Frye General Acceptance. Test and Its Critics
Until recently, the majority rule in U.S. jurisdictions for the admissibility
of scientific evidence was the Frye general acceptance test. In Frye v. United
States, 3 the District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the admissibility
of evidence based on a forerunner of the modern lie detector test. In a pithy
opinion, the court announced that "while courts will go a long way in
admitting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle
or discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which
it belongs." 4
By 1954, Frye was sufficiently conspicuous 5 to attract criticism from
Professor Charles McCormick, author of a leading treatise on evidence.
McCormick wrote that the Frye test "is a proper condition upon the court's
taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility
of scientific evidence." 6 To replace Frye, McCormick advocated what has
become known as the relevancy approach: 7 "Any relevant conclusions which
are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are
other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, its probative value may be overborne
by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, unfair surprise
and undue consumption of time."18
12. Id.
13. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
14. Id. at 1014.
15. It is unclear how quickly the Frye test spread. Courts cited Frye only five times in published
opinions before World War II, mostly in cases involving lie detectors. After World War II, courts cited
Frye six times before 1950, 20 times during the 1950s, and 21 times during the 1960s. Bert Black et al.,
Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV.
715, 722 n.30 (1994). The paucity of citations to Frye does not necessarily mean that courts ignored it.
First, many courts may have adopted the general acceptance test without citing Frye. See, e.g., Puhl v.
Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 99 N.W.2d 163, 168-69 (Wis. 1959) (paraphrasing Frye and adopting general
acceptance test, but not citing case); People v. Miller, 98 N.W.2d 524, 525 (Mich. 1959) (adopting
"general scientific recognition" test, but not citing Frye); Shanks v. State, 45 A.2d 85, 86 (Md. 1945)
(discussing "general acceptance" standard for use of blood tests without citing Frye). Second, Frye applied
only to novel scientific techniques, and there were few major advances in forensic evidence during this
period that courts did not quickly accept. See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert: Interpreting the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1999, 2003-04 (1994). Third, attorneys and judges rarely applied the
Frye rule to novel scientific evidence in civil cases. See MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL
EVIDENCE § 703.2, at 651 (3d ed. 1991); 1 DAVID W. LouisELL & CHRIsTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL
EVIDENCE 853 & n.24 (1977). Frye therefore was seldom an issue in medical malpractice and other civil
cases, even when a party presented evidence at the frontier of science. Finally, another possible reason
that Frye is not cited very frequently before the 1970s is that until then state courts decided almost all
criminal cases. State courts are far less likely to take a systematic approach to an area of law than federal
courts, and are far more likely to decide issues such as the admissibility of scientific evidence on an ad
hoe basis. State courts also publish very few of their opinions, particularly at the trial court level.
16. CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363 (1954).
17. Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a
Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1232 (1980).
18. MCCORMICK, supra note 16, at 363-64.
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The statutory Federal Rules of Evidence, 9 which went into effect in
1975, failed to clarify the standard for admitting novel scientific evidence,
although several rules had a potential bearing on the issue. Rule 702 states
that any qualified expert who possesses "scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge [that] will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue" may testify at trial. 20 The only clear
effect of this rule was to liberalize the type of person who could appear as an
expert. Any other interpretation is in the eye of the beholder.2 ' Rule 403
permits the exclusion of relevant evidence if dangers of prejudice, confusion,
misleading the jury, or wasting time substantially outweigh its probative
value.' Rule 703 provides that the facts or data on which experts base their
opinions need not be admissible if they are "reasonably relied upon by experts
in the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the
subject .... "I The Rules do not mention Frye.
Frye became a contentious issue around the same time the Federal Rules
came into effect, as courts began to rule on the admissibility of forensic
scientific evidence such as "voiceprint" identifications, bite mark
comparisons, and hypnotically refreshed testimony.24 This period also
marked the beginning of the federalization of criminal law, when the federal
government began to prosecute crimes that had once been solely the
responsibility of the states. The Frye rule, which originated in a federal
opinion, naturally began to attract added attention.
Commentators began to attackFrye on a variety of grounds. Some argued
that Frye was too conservative in restricting evidence that had not yet received
"general acceptance."' Others were unhappy with Frye's vagueness. The
19. The Federal Rules of Evidence are only binding on federal courts, but they have been voluntarily
adopted by many states.
20. FED. R. EViD. 702.
21. For example, one commentator submits that rule 702 was clearly meant to abolish the common
law rule that expert testimony had to be beyond the common knowledge of the average layperson. Leslie
A. Lunney, Protecting Juries from Themselves: Restricting the Admission of Expert Testimony in Toxic
Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. REv. 103, 119, 121-22 (1994). Several courts, however, have found that only
testimony that meets the "beyond common knowledge" test is helpful to the jury and passes muster under
rule 702. See, e.g., United States v. Tapia-Ortiz, 23 F.3d 738, 741 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that testimony
concerning "the weight, purity, dosages, and prices of cocaine clearly relates to knowledge beyond the
ken of the average juror" and thus is acceptable expert testimony); United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532,
534 (4th Cir. 1993) (holding district court did not err in excluding testimony under Fed. R. Evid. 702 as
court should consider whether testimony presented is simply reiterating facts already "within the common
knowledge" ofjurors); United States v. Brewer, 783 F.2d 841, 842 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 831
(1986) (excluding forensic anthropologist's testimony that defendant might not be robber in surveillance
picture because jury could make determination on its own).
22. FED. R. EviD. 403.
23. FED. R. EviD. 703.
24. Giannelli, supra note 15, at 2004-09. Forensic science became more important to prosecutors
both because of technological advances and because decisions by the United States Supreme Court in the
1960s favoring the rights of the accused made it more difficult for prosecutors to use other types of
evidence. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (holding that prosecution may not use
statements stemming from custodial interrogation without use of procedural safegaurds); Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961) (holding that Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures applies to state criminal defendants).
25. E.g., Giannelli, supra note 17, at 1226 (noting that under Frye potentially helpful evidence may
be excluded until general scientific consensus develops); see also Fredric I. Lederer, Resolving the Frye
Dilemma-A Reliability Approach, 26 JURIMETRIcS J. 240, 241 (1986) ("Frye tends to be unduly
opinion does not specifically define "general acceptance" or the "particular
field's" boundaries, nor does it suggest whether the judge should defer to the
scientific community or use another standard to resolve these uncertainties.26
In fact, confusion among judges on these issues led to contradictory Frye
rulings in different jurisdictions concerning the same types of evidence.27
Immediately after the Federal Rules went into effect, some courts adopted
the relevancy approach, while most continued to apply Frye.28 Both
approaches remained viable, but in the ensuing years a third approach, which
became known as the reliability approach, began to win adherents.
B. The Emergence of the Reliability Test
In United States v. Williams,29 a 1978 case upholding a district court's
admission of voiceprint evidence, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
rejected Frye and held that courts should determine the admissibility of
scientific evidence, like any other evidence, by weighing probativeness,
materiality, and reliability against any tendency to mislead or confuse the jury,
or to prejudice the defendant unfairly." The court then looked to several
specific factors in assessing reliability, including the acceptance of the
technique "among scientists who had worked with spectrograms," the relevant
error rate, the standards for conducting tests pronounced by the International
Association of Voice Identification, the care with which the expert applied the
technique, the analogy between voiceprints and other accepted analytic
methods, and "failsafe" characteristics that prevented the misuse of the
technique.
3'
On its face, Williams was hardly a revolutionary opinion, as it simply
presented a minor variation on the relevancy test. But several commentators,
opposed to Frye but unhappy with the extremely lax nature of the relevancy
test, seized and expanded on the reliability criterion suggested by the Second
Circuit in Williams. They argued that courts applying the relevancy test should
incorporate a significant reliability aspect into that test. For example, a
leading evidence treatise authored by Judge Jack Weinstein and Professor
Margaret Berger advocated a reliability test, and listed the following as factors
for determining reliability:
* the technique's general acceptance in the field;
* the expert's qualifications and stature;
* the use which has been made of the new technique;
conservative in its effect on the admissibility of novel evidence.").
26. 1 LOuiSELL & MUELLER, supra note 15, § 105; Giannelli, supra note 17, at 1248. But see Philip
H. Dixon, Recent Developments, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 875, 881 (1979) (arguing that Frye's vagueness
is beneficial and gives court considerable leeway in deciding whether new scientific technique has achieved
general acceptance in its appropriate field).
27. Black et al., supra note 15, at 739 (noting courts applying Frye have both admitted and rejected
voiceprint evidence).
28. See Giannelli, supra note 17, at 1228-31.
29. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
30. Id. at 1198.
31. Id. at 1199.
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* the potential rate of error;
* the existence of specialized literature;
* the novelty of the new invention; and
* the extent to which the technique relies on the subjective
interpretation of the expert. 2
C. The Evidentiary Challenge of Toxic Tort Litigation
As debate grew over the relative merits of Frye, the relevancy approach,
and the reliability approach, courts were soon faced with a new evidentiary
challenge - toxic tort litigation. Plaintiffs' attorneys in toxic tort cases seldom
had hard, nonspeculative scientific data on their side, and their theories of
causation were often overwhelmingly rejected by the mainstream scientific
community. 3 Nevertheless, they found qualified expert witnesses to testify
on their clients' behalf. These scientists were usually sincere in their beliefs
that the mainstream scientific community had it wrong; less often, they were
venal guns for hire. 4
Defense attorneys began to argue that the plaintiffs' scientific evidence
must be excluded as unreliable under the Federal Rules of Evidence. The
varied reactions of courts to defendants' motions to exclude evidence are best
represented by the Agent Orange35 and Ferebee?6 cases.
In Ferebee, a case involving a novel claim that exposure to a herbicide
caused cancer, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals applied an extremely liberal
test.37  Ferebee became a leading precedent favoring the relevancy
32. See JACK WEINSTEIN & MARGARET BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 702[03] (1995). Because
this book is a looseleaf service, it is now difficult to determine when this test was first proposed, but
apparently it appeared in the book by 1983. See Giannelli, supra note 15, at 2014.
Justice Mark McCormick of the Iowa Supreme Court proposed eleven factors that courts should
consider in determining the reliability of scientific evidence:
(1) the technique's potential error rate;
(2) the existence and maintenance of standards governing its use;
(3) the presence of safeguards in the technique's characteristics;
(4) analogy to other scientific techniques whose results are admissible;
(5) the extent to which scientists in the relevant field have accepted the technique;
(6) the nature and breadth of the inference adduced;
(7) the clarity and simplicity with which the technique can be described and its results
explained;
(8) the extent to which the courts and jury can verify the basic data;
(9) the availability of other experts to test and evaluate the technique;
(10) the evidence's probative significance in the circumstances of the case; and
(11) the care with which the expert employed the technique.
Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining a NewApproach to Admissibility, 67 IOWA L. REV. 879,
911-12 (1982).
33. See generally PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 137 (Kenneth R. Foster
et al. eds., 1993) (discussing various examples of toxic tort litigation and the lack of scientific support for
plaintiffs' claims). I was a co-editor of Phantom Risk.
34. HUBER, supra note 4, at 19.
35. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), af'd, 818 F.2d
187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
36. Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir.) (plaintiff alleged injury from
paraquat exposure), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1062 (1984).
37. Ferebee, 736 F.2d at 1536.
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approach.3"
Meanwhile, the Agent Orange case became a leading precedent in favor
of intensive judicial scrutiny of scientific evidence.39 In Agent Orange, the
plaintiffs attempted to present testimony based primarily on animal studies that
the defoliant Agent Orange caused a variety of ailments in Vietnam veterans.
Judge Weinstein excluded the plaintiffs' expert testimony under Federal Rules
of Evidence 703 and 403 because the experts did not base their opinions on
information reasonably relied upon by other experts in the scientific
community and because their testimony did not meet "minimum standards of
reliability."'
As legal scholar and attorney Bert Black notes, Judge Weinstein's Agent
Orange opinion was particularly significant because the judge did not apply
a balancing test - such as the one proposed in the judge's own treatise4' -
to determine whether the experts' techniques were reliable.42 Black argues
that the problem with balancing tests is that they allow courts to substitute
vague buzzwords for the sophisticated analysis that judges should undertake
in determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.43 Judge Weinstein
avoided this problem by focusing on the validity of the experts' reasoning. He
ultimately concluded that the plaintiffs' experts could not appropriately
extrapolate from animal studies to human causation without confirming
epidemiological data."
While Judge Weinstein's opinion received a great deal of attention,45
many courts continued to apply the more liberal relevancy test promoted in
Ferebee. Federal and state decisions, often relying on Ferebee, upheld the
awards of millions of dollars to plaintiffs with extremely dubious claims."
38. Critics called this "the let-it-all-in" approach. In re Air Crash Disaster at New Orleans, La., 795
F.2d 1230, 1234 (5th Cir. 1986) (complaining that decisions to receive expert testimony are often "simply
tossed off to the jury under a 'let it all in' philosophy"); HUBER, supra note 4, at 17; Bert Black & David
H. Hollander, Jr., Unravelling Causation: Back to the Basics, 3 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 24 (1993).
39. Arvin Maskin, The Impact of Daubert on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The Supreme
Court Catches Up with a Decade of Jurisprudence, 15 CARDozo L. REV. 1929, 1931 (1994).
40. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818
F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1234 (1988).
41. See Giannelli supra note 15, at 2014.
42. Black, supra note 3, at 685-86.
43. Black proposes a theoretical framework for determining relevance based on consideration of two
factors: (1) the validity of the reasoning leading to a conclusion, and (2) the reliability of the conclusion.
Id.; see also Barry M. Epstein & Marc S. Klein, The Use and Abuse of Expert Testimony in Product
Liability Actions, 17 SETON HALL L. REV. 656, 673-74 (1987) (distinguishing reliability of experts' data
from experts' reasoning).
44. Agent Orange, 611 F. Supp. at 1250-55.
45. In 1986 alone, one book and several law review articles focused on the Agent Orange decision.
See PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL (1986); Neil B. Cohen, The Costs of Acceptability:
Blue Buses, Agent Orange, and Aversion to Stbtistical Evidence, 66 B.U. L. REV. 563 (1986); Charles
Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Fqciffnding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV.
521 (1986); Peter H. Schuck, The Role of Judges in Settling Complex Cases: The Agent Orange Example,
53 U. Cm. L. REV. 337 (1986); Paul Sherman, Agent Orange and the Problem of the Indeterminate
Plaintiff, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 369 (1986).
46. E.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd in part,
modified in part, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.) (upholding award of approximately $5 million for birth defects
allegedly caused by spermicidej, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986); Elam v. Alcolac, Inc., 765 S.W.2d
42 (Mo. Ct. App. 1988) (upholding award of over $40 million based on discredited theory of "clinical
ecology"). There was scant scientific evidence supporting the judgment in Wells, and it was roundly
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Eventually, criticism of such awards led many courts to follow Judge
Weinstein's lead and tighten their scrutiny of scientific evidence. 47
D. The Revival of Frye
In United States v. Downing,48 the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, like
the court in Agent Orange, explicitly adopted a test that focused on an
expert's reasoning. The court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence require
a trial court to conduct a preliminary inquiry focusing not only on the
soundness and reliability of the technique used in generating the evidence, and
the possibility that admitting the evidence would confuse or mislead the jury,
but also on the proffered connection between the technical data and the
disputed factual issues in the case.49 The Third Circuit thus did not define
relevance in laymen's term, as Professor McCormick favored, 0 but in
scientific terms. Courts in the Third Circuit became obligated to review not
only the general soundness of an expert's technique, but also the expert's
extrapolation from that technique to his conclusion.
Lower courts in the Third Circuit applied the Downing reliability test and
excluded evidence in several toxic tort cases. When these cases were
appealed, however, the Third Circuit vacated the district courts' rulings.
51
Although the Third Circuit had established what appeared to be a strict test
for the admissibility of scientific evidence, in practice it applied a liberal,
forgiving test.
Critics of the misuse of science in civil cases began to lose patience with
the reliability approach. The Third Circuit's failure to follow through on the
Downing criteria caused them to search for alternatives to the Federal
Rules.' Many pinned their hopes on a rejuvenated general acceptance test.
Courts had started to reformulate the Frye test to address the underlying
reliability of expert scientific opinion as early as 1975, when a federal
criticized in both the scientific and mainstream media. For a review of the science involved, see James
L. Mills, Spermicides and Birth Defects, in PHANTOM RISK, supra note 33, at 87. For harsh crititicism
of the Wells decision, see James L. Mills & Duane Alexander, Occasional Notes: Teratogens and
"Litogens", 325 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1234, 1235 (1986); Federal Judges vs. Science, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
27, 1986, § 1, at 22. For harsh criticism of Elam, see Richard S. Cornfield & Stuart F. Schlossman,
Inmunologic Laboratory Tests: A Critique of the Alcolac Decision, in PHANTOM RIsK, supra note 33, at
401. Many more examples of tort judgments in favor of plaintiffs that lacked a sound scientific basis are
described in PHANTOM RISK, supra note 33.
47. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam)
(en bane opinion establishing strict standards for admissibility of scientific evidence), cert, denied, 112
S. Ct. 1280 (1992); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799 (D.D.C. 1986) (granting
judgment notwithstanding verdict in Bendectin case), aff'd, 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 882 (1989).
48. 753 F.2d 1224 (3d Cir. 1985).
49. Id. at 1237.
50. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
51. See, e.g., In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990); DeLuca v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).
52. See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Sherwood, In Re Paoli Railroad: The Third Circuit Punts to the Coffin
Corner, Toxics L. REP., Nov. 14, 1990, at 773; Lanny S. Kurzweil et al., The Environmental Expert
After Rubanick and Christophersen: Beware the Jabberwock! (PLI Order No. H4-5121 Dec. 1991-Jan.
1992); David Bernstein, Note, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert Witness Problem in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LITIG. 117, 138 (1990).
appellate court held that it "deem[ed] general acceptance as being nearly
synonymous with reliability." 3 In 1978, the California Supreme Court,
perhaps the most influential state court in the country due to California's large
population, held that under its version of the Frye test, the proponent of the
scientific evidence must establish "(1) the reliability of the method ....
usually by expert testimony, and (2) [that] the witness furnishing such
testimony [is] properly qualified as an expert to give an opinion on the
subject. Additionally, the proponent.., must demonstrate that correct
scientific procedures were used in the particular case."' This test became
known as the Kelly-Frye test.
In 1987, in State v. Castro, 5 the New York Court of Appeals found that
the then-current state of the law required Frye courts, at a minimum, to ask
two questions: (1) Is there a theory that is generally accepted in the scientific
community that supports the conclusion that the scientific test can produce
reliable results? and (2) Are there currently techniques and experiments
capable of producing reliable results that are generally accepted in the
scientific community? The court, like the California Supreme Court, then
added a third query: whether the expert performed the technique in an
accepted manner in the particular case. 6 Several other courts adopted this
third criterion as well, mainly in the context of DNA testing. 7
Some courts began to use a test analogous to Castro in toxic tort cases.
Instead of analyzing whether experts performed a particular technique
properly, as would make sense in a forensic context, courts determined
whether experts extrapolated from their data in a generally accepted manner.
In Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 8 the plaintiff claimed that
exposure to chemical fumes at the battery manufacturing plant where her
husband had worked caused his fatal colon cancer. The Fifth Circuit adopted
a four part test for the admissibility of scientific evidence, which relied on
rules 403, 702, and 703, and the Frye rule. The test focused on:
* the expert's qualifications (rule 702);
* the factual basis for the testimony (rule 703);
* the level of acceptance of the methodology employed (Frye); and
* the balance between probativeness and the potential for undue
prejudice (rule 403).5'
53. United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25, 33 n.12 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1042.
54. People v. Kelly, 549 P.2d 1240, 1244 (Cal. 1976).
55. 545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 987 (1989).
56. Id.
57. United States v. Two Bulls, 918 F.2d 56, 61 (8th Cir. 1990); Ex pane Perry, 586 So.2d 242,
248 (Ala. 1991); People v. Lindsey, 868 P.2d 1085, 1090-91 (Colo. App. 1993); Commonwealth v.
Rodgers, 605 A.2d .1228, 1234 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). But see State v. Cauthron, 846 P.2d 502, 506
(Wash. 1993) (rejecting third prong of test). See generally Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Debate in the
DNA Cases over the Foundation for the Admission of Scientiflc Evidence: The Importance of Human Error
as a Cause of Forensic Misanalysis, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 19 (1991) (discussing case law on expert
testimony in DNA testing).
58. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
59. Id. at 1110-12.
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The court, citing Bert Black's influential article,6" ultimately concluded that
the methodology or reasoning that the plaintiff's expert had used to arrive at
his conclusion was not generally accepted within the relevant scientific
community. 1
Shortly after the Fifth Circuit decided Christophersen, Peter Huber's
Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom was published. Huber's
book, which reached a mass audience, detailed the misuse of scientific
evidence in a range of civil cases. The book attracted a great deal of attention
and made the issue of "junk science" into a matter of public debate.62 A
consistent theme of Huber's book was that in order to avoid the risk of being
bamboozled by fringe scientists, courts should defer to mainstream scientific
opinion when reviewing scientific evidence. Huber, who was also influenced
by Black, strongly advocated "a sophisticated, modern application of Frye
[that] looks to the methods behind a scientific report. "63
E. The Supreme Court Enters the Fray
The resurgence of Frye set the stage for the Supreme Court's 1993
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals 4.6 Daubert involved
two boys born with tragic birth defects that reduced the size of their limbs.
Their parents sued, alleging that the mothers' use of the morning sickness
drug Bendectin during pregnancy had caused the children's deformities. The
problem facing the plaintiffs was that the defendant presented the trial court
with overwhelming scientific evidence from epidemiological studies showing
that fetuses exposed to Bendectin do not have a higher rate of limb reductions
than those not exposed.
The plaintiffs countered by presenting experts who testified that based on
their reanalyses of the data used in those epidemiological studies, they
believed that Bendectin does cause birth defects. The district court found this
evidence incompetent and granted summary judgment for the defendant.6 5
The plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
affirmed.66 The court began by emphasizing its adherence to the Frye
rule. 7 It then noted that the plaintiffs' experts had not submitted their
reanalyses to peer review or published them in a scientific journal. 8 Citing
Huber, the court applied a unique version of Frye. It held that because the
experts' reanalyses were not subjected to verification and scrutiny by others
in the field, the results of their studies would not be accepted in the scientific
60. Black, supra note 3.
61. Christopherson, 939 F.2d at l111 n.9.
62. "The 1992 Republican platform included a promise to 'throw out "junk science"' from American
courtrooms." Jeff L. Lewin, Calabresi's Revenge? Junk Science in the Work of Peter Huber, 21 HOFSTRA
L. REv. 183, 185 (1992) (citation omitted).
63. HUBER, supra note 4, at 200.
64. 727 F. Supp. 570 (S.D. Cal. 1989).
65. Id.
66. 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 1129-30.
68. Id. at 1130.
community. 69
This opinion quickly gained notoriety for its strong exclusionary bent. Not
only did the Ninth Circuit rely exclusively on the Frye rule in a civil case, it
also adopted the position that it is not the expert's technique, theory, or even
reasoning process that must be generally accepted. Rather, when testifying on
an issue of general interest to the scientific community, an expert must submit
her research to peer review, because only such review, outside of the
litigation context, can qualify her research as generally accepted in the
scientific community.
The Supreme Court, which had rejected earlier opportunities to establish
standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules,
granted certiorari to decide whether Frye was still viable under the Federal
Rules, particularly rule 702.
The Supreme Court's decision in Daubert established new guidelines for
the admissibility of scientific evidence. The Court first announced that the
promulgation of the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded Frye and that
a simplistic "general acceptance" approach to the admissibility of scientific
evidence violates those rules.70 But the Court also rejected the let-it-all-in
relevancy approach and affirmed that district court judges have an important
role to play as "gatekeepers" in excluding unreliable scientific evidence.71
The Court noted that rule 702 "clearly contemplates some degree of regulation
of the subjects and theories about which an expert may testify.'72 The text
of rule 702, the Court continued, requires that proffered scientific evidence
constitute "scientific ... knowledge." "The adjective 'scientific,'" stated the
Court, "implies a grounding in the methods and procedures of science," "while
the word knowledge "connotes more than subjective belief or unsupported
speculation."'
After rejecting the let-it-all-in standard, the Court proceeded to establish
a two part reliability and helpfulness test to use in determining the
admissibility of scientific evidence under rule 702. The Court stated that,
although most courts only applied the Frye test to novel evidence, courts must
apply the Daubert test to all scientific evidence.74
First, the Court held that the rule's requirement of "scientific knowledge"
establishes a standard of "evidentiary reliability," defined as "trustworthiness"
and "scientific validity."' The Court then turned its attention to the other
half of rule 702, which requires that proposed expert scientific testimony
"assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in
issue."76 The Court read this language to mandate that proposed testimony
69. id. at 1131.
70. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2793-94 (1993).
71. Id. at 2798.
72. Id. at 2795.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 2796 n.11 ("Although the Frye decision itself focused exclusively on 'novel' scientific
techniques, we do not read the requirements of rule 702 to apply specially or exclusively to unconventional
evidence.").
75. Id. at 2795 n.9. One article the Court relied upon in addressing the issue of scientific validity
was Black, supra note 3. Id. at 2793 n.4.
76. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2795.
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be scientifically relevant to the issue at hand. The relevant consideration is
one of "fit" - evidence that meets the standards of scientific validity for one
purpose is not necessarily scientifically valid for other purposes.'7 As the
Court put it, rule 702's "assist the trier of fact" language "requires a valid
scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility. -"8
Under the test established by Daubert, courts confronted with challenged
expert scientific testimony must conduct two distinct inquiries. First, are the
studies or data upon which the expert is relying trustworthy? Second, if so,
are these studies or data actually probative of the issues before the court?
The Court proceeded to enumerate factors that may "bear on the inquiry"
into whether scientific evidence is admissible. The Court cautioned that these
factors do not constitute a definitive checklist or test and that courts may
consider other factors as well.79 First, courts faced with challenged scientific
evidence should determine whether the theory or technique at issue can be (or
has been) tested.80 Peer review and publication, the Court added, are
important, though not generally dispositive, factors.8 The Court also
directed judges' attention to determining the known or potential rate of error
of a technique in question, as well as the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation. 2 Moreover, despite the
official demise of Frye, general acceptance of the method or theory at issue
is still a consideration; the Court noted that "[w]idespread acceptance can be
an important factor in ruling particular evidence admissible"83 because it is
circumstantial proof that other scientists find the evidence to be reliable.
Since Daubert was published, there has been an ongoing debate over its
meaning. Most controversial has been Daubert's holding that rule 702 requires
"a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to
admissibility."'s The Court cautioned that lower courts should examine only
an expert's methodology, not her conclusions.8"
77. 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
78. Id. at 2796.
79. Id. at 2796-97; see also Black et al., supra note 15, at 721. Black builds upon and adds to the
Daubert screening factors applicable to scientific evidence, elaborating nine "guideposts" for understanding
and evaluating scientific claims. These include: (1) explanatory power; (2) falsifiability; (3) logical
consistency; (4) scope of testing; (5) consistency with accepted theories; (6) subsequent application and
use by the scientific community; (7) precision; (8) post-hypothesis testing; and (9) peer review and
publication. Black et al., supra note 15, at 783-85.
80. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796-97; see PHANTOM RISK, supra note 33, at 433.
81. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797; see PHANTOM RISK, supra note 33, at 434.
82. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2797.
83. Id.; see PHANTOM RISK, supra note 33, at 433, 435.
84. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2796.
85. Id. at 2797. Some commentators have argued that the Daubert inquiry should end when the court
has determined that the expert is using a methodology appropriate for the general subject at issue, and that
the court should not explore whether the study upon which the expert relied can validly support her
conclusions. Giannelli, supra note 15, at 2011-12; Michael H. Gottesman, Admissibility of Expert
Testimony after Daubert.- The "Prestige" Factor, 43 EMoRY L.J. 867, 869-72 (1994). This position has
managed to attract some support in the case law. Hopkins v. Dow Coming Corp., 33 F.3d 1116, 1124
(9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 734 (1995); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 555-59 (6th
Cir. 1993). The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, has held that DNA evidence is admissible
and that any questions about the mathematical techniques used by the prosecution's expert should be raised
during cross-examination. Bonds, 12 F.3d at 554-68.
Overall, it seems that Daubert may encourage strict scrutiny of scientific
evidence in some jurisdictions. Courts that were previously inclined to give
strict scrutiny to scientific evidence in such cases are continuing to do so.
Courts that were inclined toward a more liberal position have interpreted
Daubert to allow more frequent admission of questionable testimony. 6
Courts that had no strong views on scientific evidence before Daubert,
however, seem inclined to join the strict scrutiny camp. Pretrial exclusion of
scientific evidence, particularly in toxic tort cases, is becoming ever more
common. 87
Daubert has had an even greater impact on the admissibility of technical
or quasi-scientific testimony. One type of quasi-scientific testimony, testimony
based on psychological theories, has frequently been excluded in both criminal
and civil litigation since Daubert. Courts have excluded testimony by
psychiatrists and psychologists on issues involving child abuse,"8
post-traumatic stress disorder, 9  and child abuse accommodation
syndrome.9" In this respect, Daubert is stricter than Frye; many Frye
jurisdictions refused to apply the general acceptance test to such "soft"
scientific evidence. 91
Moreover, although the Daubert Court expressly restricted its holding to
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, deciding Daubert on remand, noted that Daubert
demands that in reviewing an expert's principles and methodologies, a court should determine whether
there is a valid scientific connection to the pertinent inquiry. The pertinent inquiry, the court stated, is not
simply whether Bendectin can cause birth defects, but whether it more probably than not caused the
plaintiffs' birth defects. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F.3d 1311, 1320 (9th Cir. 1995).
The court therefore determined whether the plaintiffs' experts' animal and other studies allowed a scientist
reasonably to rely on them to prove that Bendectin caused birth defects in the plaintiffs. Id. at 1320-22.
For a similar analysis, see Cavallo v. Star Enter., No. 94-1499-A, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9836, at 56-61
(E.D. Va. July 10, 1995) (rejecting evidence that exposure to fumes caused plaintiff's injuries). The author
believes that the Daubert remand opinion's take on the methodology issue is more consistent with both the
letter and the spirit of the Daubert Supreme Court opinion than that of Hopkins or Bonds.
86. The Third Circuit, for example, continuing its pro-plaintiff policy in toxic tort cases, has held
that it will give a "hard look" to cases in which a lower court has made a Daubert ruling, but only when
the court has ruled testimony inadmissible. In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 763-65 (3d
Cir. 1994).
87. For example, in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals alone, courts have excluded plaintiffs'
evidence in six cases. Bradley v. Brown, 42 F.3d 434 (7th Cir. 1994); Hayes v. Raytheon Co., 1994 WL
143000 (7th Cir. April 21, 1994); O'Conner v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 13 F.3d 1090 (7th Cir. 1994);
Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607 (7th Cir. 1993); Schmaltz v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 878 F.
Supp. 1119 (D. 111. 1995); Bradley v. Brown, 852 F.Supp. 690 (N.D. Ind. 1994).
88. E.g., Gier v. Educational Service Unit No. 16, 845 F. Supp. 1342, 1349 (D. Neb. 1994); see
also Borawick v. Shay, 842 F. Supp. 1501, 1508-09 (D. Conn. 1993) (excluding hypnotically refreshed
testimony).
89. State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192 (1993) (partial exclusion).
90. E.g., State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1130-31 (La. 1993). See generally United States v.
Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1993) (remanding case to district court for determination
of admissibility under Daubert of evidence about unreliability of eyewitness testimony).
91. E.g., People v. McDonald, 37 Cal. 3d 351, 373 (1984) (refusing to apply Frye to expert
psychological testimony regarding the unreliability of eyewitness identifications); People v. Phillips, 175
Cal. Rptr. 703, 713-14 (1981) (failing to apply Frye to evidence concerning "Munchausen's syndrome by
proxy," an unusual form of mental illness); see David McCord, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony
Regarding Rape Trauma Syndrome in Rape Prosecutions, 26 B.C. L. Rev. 1143, 1182 (1985) (stating that
courts often do not apply Frye to expert testimony based on behavioral sciences).
For a discussion of how courts should determine the admissibility of psychological and psychiatric
evidence after Daubert, see David E. Bernstein, The Science of Forensic Psychiatry and Psychology, 2
PSYCHOL., PSYCHIATRY & L. 75 (1995).
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scientific testimony, lower courts have regularly subjected technical
evidence - also covered by rule 702 - to full Daubert gatekeeper analysis.
Thus, Daubert has been applied to a broad range of specialized expert
testimony, including economics, statistics, and accounting.9" Only rarely has
a court held that Daubert is not relevant to the admissibility of technical
expert testimony. 93
In contrast to emerging doctrine under Daubert, Frye's "general
acceptance" test was almost never applied to technical evidence. Remarkably,
the readiness of post-Daubert courts to screen such testimony for reliability
indicates that Daubert has caused closer scrutiny of expert testimony in civil
cases than mere affirmance of the Frye rule would have permitted.
On the other hand, Frye is undergoing something of a renaissance in state
courts. Few state courts have as yet adopted Daubert, and three of the five
most populous states, California, New York, and Florida, have all rejected
Daubert and retained the Frye rule.
94
Im. THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CANADA,
AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND, AND ENGLAND
Until recently, few scholars in the Commonwealth focused their attention
on the admissibility of expert testimony in general, and on scientific evidence
in particular. Before the 1987 publication of Ian Freckelton's The Trial of the
Expert, there was no modern treatment of the subject of expert witnesses
outside the United States. 9 Over the last decade, however, the appropriate
standard for admitting expert evidence has become a major controversy among
judges, attorneys, and legal scholars in England, Canada, Australia, and New
Zealand.
Several themes emerge from this Article's discussion of scientific
evidence in the Commonwealth. First, until very recently, the law in most
common law nations uniformly subjected expert testimony to a liberal
92. Compare Marcel v. Placid Oil Co., 11 F.3d 563, 567-68 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding testimony to
be inadmissiable) and Martincic v. Urban Redev. Auth., 844 F. Supp. 1073, 1075-76 (W.D. Pa. 1994)
(same) and Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 200-03 (W. Va. 1994) (same) and Joy v. Bell Helicopter
Textron, Inc., 999 F.2d 549, 567-70 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (same) and Liu v. Korean Air Lines, No. 84-0690,
1993 WL 478343 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 16, 1993) (partial exclusion) and Scales v. George Washington Univ.,
No. 89-0796, 1993 WL 304016, at *6*7 (D.D.C. July 27, 1993) (same) with Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1175-76 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding testimony to be admissible) and Petruzzi's
IGA Supermarkets v. Darling-Delaware Co., 998 F.2d 1224, 1236-39 (3d Cir. 1993) (same) and Davis
v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 1994-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 70,510, (S.D. Fla. 1994)
(same) and Seagate Technology v. Commissioner, 102 T.C. 149, 299-303 (U.S.T.C. 1994) (same).
93. Iacobelli Constr. v. County of Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding Daubert standard
inapplicable to construction experts); Tamarin v. Adam Caterers, Inc., 13 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1993)
(holding Daubert irrelevant to payroll review by accountant); see also United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880
F. Supp. 1027, 1041 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (rejecting application of Daubert to forensic document
examination).
94. People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 331 (1994); State v. Flanagan, 625 So. 2d 827, 828 (Fla.
1993); People v. Wesley, 633 N.E.2d 451, 454 (N.Y. 1994). Texas, however, has adopted Daubert. E.I.
du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Robinson, No. 94-0843, 1995 Tex. LEXIS 103, at *22-*23 (Tex. June
15, 1995). A recent article concludes that 22 states remain firmly in the Frye camp. Joseph R. Meany,
From Frye to Daubert: Is a Pattern Unfolding?, 35 JuR1METRICS J. 191, 193-94 (1995).
95. C.R. Williams, Book Review, 21 AUsTL./N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 62, 62 (1988) (reviewing IAN
R. FRECKLETON, THE TRIAL OF THE EXPERT (1987)).
relevancy test. This contrasts with the United States, where the Frye general
acceptance test has influenced the law of scientific evidence for more than
seventy years. Scholarly and judicial attitudes, however, are now slowly
changing in these other countries to favor stricter pretrial scrutiny.
Second, Frye is strongly influencing the debate over the admissibility of
scientific evidence in the Commonwealth. While the Frye controversy is
muted in England, the debate over the admissibility of scientific evidence in
Canada, Australia, and New Zealand often focuses on Frye's general
acceptance test.
This influence of Frye on the common law outside of the United States
is a new phenomenon. As recently as 1988, Professor Edward J. Imwinkelried
of the University of California at Davis Law School wrote that "[f]rom a
comparative law perspective, it is difficult to defend the Frye rule."96 After
briefly examining the law in other common law and civil law countries,
Imwinkelried concluded that "[i]n enforcing the Frye rule, American courts
appear to stand alone. ""9 One could no longer make that statement today, as
Frye gains prominence in other common law countries. (Daubert may,
however, start eroding Frye's influence abroad).98 It is now far less difficult
to defend Frye from a comparative law perspective.
As we will see, the spread of the Frye test is but one example of the
influence of the American junk science debate on Commonwealth law.
Unfortunately, Commonwealth courts, legal scholars, and reformers
sometimes misinterpret American precedent, and too frequently rely on
outdated sources. This (sometimes misinformed) reliance on American law is
a third theme of this section.
Finally, this Article shows that, with the possible exception of England
and its relevancy test, the rules regarding the admissibility of scientific
evidence are in flux in many of the Commonwealth countries. Commonwealth
courts cite local precedents and scholarship, along with cases, books, and
articles from their sister common law jurisidictions, including the United
States. None of these jurisdictions has, however, created a uniform test for
admissibility to replace the relevancy test.
A. The Law of Scientific Evidence in Canada
In recent years Canadian courts have carefully scrutinized scientific
evidence before allowing its admission. They have not, however, settled on
a uniform test to use in screening the admissibility of scientific evidence.",
96. E.J. Imwinkelried, A Comparative LawAnalysis of the Standard ofAdmitting Scientific Evidence:
The United States Stands Alone, 42 FORENSIC SCI. INT'L 15, 27 (1988).
97. Id. at 28.
98. See, e.g., R. v. T., No. 4961/94, 1994 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 4017, at *37-*39 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.
Nov. 30, 1994) (adopting Daubert).
99. JOHN SoPINKA Er AL., THE LAW OF EVIDENCE IN CANADA 567 (1992). See also R. v. Lafferty,
80 C.C.C.3d 150, 151 (N.W. T. Sup. Ct. 1993) ("There is no specific test for admissibility of novel
scientific evidence such as the test of general acceptance by the scientific community which is used in some
United States jurisdictions."); S. Rosaline Baker, A Critical Approach to the Admissibility and Weight of
DNA Evidence in Canada, 20 C.R.4th 212, 213 (1993) ("Currently, the test for the admissibility of novel
scientific evidence in Canada is unclear."); Ronda Bessner, The Road Not Taken: The Refitsal of the
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Most courts have adopted some version of a reliability test, while a minority
apply the general acceptance test. The Canadian Supreme Court has discussed
scientific evidence three times,'" but has never announced a broadly
applicable test. Until it does, the rules regarding the admissibility of scientific
evidence will continue to vary widely.
1. The Frye Debate in Canada
As noted above, a minority of Canadian judges and scholars has
advocated adoption of the Frye general acceptance test. In R. v.
Medvedew,l'0 a 1978 case involving the admissibility of spectrographic or
"voice print" analysis, a dissenting judge stated that he did not know
"whether the [Frye] test had been adopted in Canadian courts or not," but that
"it makes sound sense and expresses a view in accord with the principles of
common law."' 2 In 1985, the Law Reform Commission of Canada
recommended that forensic "techniques that do not meet the test propounded
in the Frye case should be regarded with a considerable degree of
scepticism. " "
Most judges, however, have resisted adopting Frye. In 1986, an Ontario
District Court judge, basing his argument on articles by Justice
McCormick,"°4 and by Professor Paul Giannelli of Case Western,'05 said
that "it would be folly to adopt the threshold requirement imposed by the Frye
standard on the proponent of new scientific evidence." 0 6 Instead, the court
advocated adoption of the "more flexible" relevancy and helpfulness
approach. According to the court, this method is reflected in rule 702 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence.0 7
The court was apparently unaware of the emerging debate in the United
States over the scope of rule 702. It described rule 702 as establishing a
liberal relevancy test, similar to that set forth in the English case of R. v.
Turner.'°8 Turner, as the Canadian court noted, held that an expert's opinion
Supreme Court of Canada to Articulate a Testfor the Admissibility of Polygraph Evidence, 60 C.R.3d 55,
56 (1990) (noting that Canadian Supreme Court has failed to address fundamental legal question of what
standard courts should use in deciding admissibility of evidence derived from scientific techniques such
as polygraph, voice spectrograph, ballistics, or hypnosis); Marie Lussier, Tailoring the Rules of
Admissibility: Genes and Canadian CriminalLaw, 71 CAN. B. REV. 319, 337 (1992) ("[N]o clear position
has yet been confirmed in Canadian jurisprudence with respect to the admissibility of novel scientific
evidence .... ."); David Paciocco, Evaluating Expert Opinion Evidence for the Purpose of Determining
Admissibility: Lessons from the Law of Evidence, 27 C.R.4th 302, at 310 (1994) [hereinafter
Evaluating]("[Frye] is not the law of Canada. Exactly what the law is, is not quite as clear .... ."); David
M. Paciocco, The Law of Evidence: Recasting Rules to Perform New Roles, in SPECIAL LECTURES OF THE
LAW SOCIETY OF UPPER CANADA: APPLYING THE LAW OF EVIDENCE-TACTCS AND TECHNIQUES FOR
THE NINETIES 1, 35 (1991) [hereinafter Recasting].
100. The Canadian Supreme Court discussed scientific evidence in R. v. Beland, [1987] 2 S.C.R.
398; R. v. Lavalle, 55 C.C.C.3d 97 (1990); and R. V. Mohan, 89 C.C.C.3d 402 (1994).
101. 6 C.R.3d 185 (Man. Ct. App. 1978).
102. Id. at 200 (O'Sullivan, J., dissenting).
103. LAW REFORM COMM'N OF CAN., REPORT No. 25: OBTAINING FORENSIC EVIDENCE 25 (1985).
104. McCormick, supra note 32.
105. Gannelli, supra note 17.
106. Regina v. Doe, 31 C.C.C.3d 353, 368 (Ont. Dist. Ct. 1986).
107. Id.
108. 60 Crim. App. 80 (1974).
is admissible if it will "furnish the court with scientific information which is
likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of a judge or jury. "' ° But
by 1986, several American courts had interpreted rule 702 far more
narrowly."1
0
2. The Canadian Supreme Court Adopts a Liberal Approach
In the 1987 case of R. v. Beland," the Canadian Supreme Court faced
the issue of whether polygraph tests submitted by a defendant were
admissible. The prosecution argued for the exclusion of the polygraph
evidence since it is "not reliable to an acceptable standard."' Justice
McIntyre, speaking for the majority, rejected the reliability approach, and
stated that "even the finding of a significant percentage of error" in the results
of a polygraph "would not, by itself, be sufficient ground to exclude it as an
instrument for use in the courts."" 3 But the court still held that polygraphs
are inadmissible because the credibility of the issue it measures falls within
the experience of judges and juries. Since the polygraph requires an operator,
the polygraph only masks human fallibility "with the mystique of
science."" 4 The court did not adopt a more general test to evaluate the
admissibility of scientific evidence." 5
Justice Wilson wrote an influential dissent in Beland advocating a liberal
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Her opinion reflects a
somewhat dated understanding of American evidence law. Apparently unaware
of the emergence of the reliability test in the United States, she viewed the
Crown's argument as an attempt to introduce the Frye test into Canadian
law." '6 Wilson quoted with approval Iowa Supreme Court Justice Mark
McCormick's assertion that American courts were moving away from Frye
because it was "too rigid, somewhat unclear, and an unnecessary and
undesirable barrier to the admissibility of scientific evidence in some
situations."" 7 Neglecting an emerging trend toward strict scrutiny in the
United States, Justice Wilson relied on data from Justice McCormick's dated
article to argue in favor of following a "discernable trend" in the United
109. Id. at 83. This was also the law in the United States before Frye. Frye v. United States, 293
F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) ("The rule is that the opinions of experts or skilled witnesses are
admissible in evidence in those cases in which the matter of inquiry is such that inexperienced persons are
unlikely to prove capable of forming a correct judgment upon it." (quoting defendant's brief)).
110. E.g., United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1237 (3d Cir. 1985) (interpreting rule 702 as
requiring inquiry into reliability of process or technique used in generating evidence, and into connection
between proffered technical data and disputed factual issues in case); Will v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.,
647 F. Supp. 544, 548 (S.D. Ga. 1986) (excluding expert testimony regarding components and effects of
Bendectin).
111. [1987] 2 S.C.R. 398.
112. Id. at 432 (Wilson, J., dissenting) (stating reliability should not be standard for admissibility).
113. Id. at 417.
114. Id. at 418.
115. For possible rationales supporting the court's opinion, see Eilis S. Magner, Exclusion of
Polygraph Evidence: Can it be Justified?, 30 CRIM. L.Q. 412 (1988). For a comparative perspective, see
Eliahu Harnon, Evidence Obtained by Polygraph: An Israeli Perspective, 1982 CRM. L. REV. 340.
116. 2 S.C.R. at 432.
117. Id. at 433 (quoting McCormick, supra note 32, at 904).
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States toward an expansive admissibility standard.' Yet, by 1987 the trend
in the United States was arguably toward more restrictive rules for the
admissibility of scientific evidence.
Three years later, in R. v. Lavallee,' 19 Justice Wilson wrote an opinion
allowing the admission of evidence of battered woman syndrome if the
accused had a reasonable fear of death or injury. Justice Wilson concluded
that battered spouse syndrome was beyond the understanding of the average
juror.' 20 Testimony regarding the syndrome could help dispel myths that
jurors were likely to believe, such as the idea that a severely beaten woman
would necessarily leave her husband, or that women enjoy being beaten. 
21
This opinion did little to clarify the rule for the admissibility of scientific
evidence in Canada, however, since the court limited its holding to evidence
regarding battered woman syndrome. But Justice Wilson's opinion implicitly
adopted the liberal relevancy standard because she did not inquire "into the
integrity of the theory that the expert employed."'"
Justice Sopinka wrote a concurrence in Lavallee that incorporated a
version of the Frye rule. He stated that an expert should arrive at an opinion
"on the basis of forms of enquiry and practice that are accepted means of
decision within that expertise." 2
3. Lower Court Reaction
Because a majority of the Canadian Supreme Court did not settle on a test
for the admissibility of scientific evidence in Beland or Lavallee,2 4 but
instead decided each case on its facts, lower Canadian courts were largely on
their own. Some courts found Justice Wilson's rejection of Frye in Beland
persuasive. But instead of adopting a relevancy test, these courts substituted
flexible, multipart reliability tests that borrowed heavily from American law.
In R. v. Johnston," for example, an Ontario General Division court,
relying on Justice Wilson's dissent in Beland, held "that the Frye test should
not be adopted in Canada." Instead, a "more expansive admissibility standard,
relevancy and helpfulness," should be adopted.' 26 The court, citing
American sources including Justice McCormick's Iowa Law Review
article 27 and two Second Circuit opinions, United States v. Williams1
2 1
118. Id. (quoting McCormick, supra note 32, at 904).
119. 55 C.C.C.3d 97 (1990).
120. Id. at 125.
121. Id. For more on battered woman syndrome evidence in Canada, see generally ELIzABETH
COMACK, FEMINIST ENGAGEMENT wrrH THE LAW: THE LEGAL RECOGNITION OF THE BATrERED WOMAN
SYNDROME (1993); Donna Martinson et al., A Forum on Lavallee v. R.: Women and Self-Defense, 25
U.B.C. L. REV. 23 (1991).
122. Paciocco, Evaluating, supra note 99, at 312.
123. 55 C.C.C.3d at 132 (Sopinka, J., concurring).
124. For an argument that the two decisions are at odds, see Paciocco, Evaluating, supra note 99,
at 306. According to Paciocco, Beland stands for the traditional view that jurors do not generally need
expert advice on human behavior, while Lavallee rejects that view.
125. 69 C.C.C.3d 395 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. 1992).
126. Id. at 415.
127. McCormick, supra note 32, at 904.
128. 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1117 (1979).
and United States v. Jakobetz,29 in essence adopted the early reliability tests
advocated in the United States. 30 The judge noted that he could be criticized
for excessive "cross-border shopping." But he "found the selection of
'merchandise' much wider and better displayed"; he therefore "made the
decision to pay duty, G.S.T. and import."'
In R. v. Melaragni,m' another Ontario General Division judge applied
a multifactor test to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence. First,
the court held that novel evidence must be relevant, pass a minimum threshold
test of reliability, be outside the experience and knowledge of the trier of fact,
and be tendered through a properly qualified expert. Once those preconditions
were met, the court considered nine additional factors.133 The court added
129. 955 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 104 (1993).
130. The court enunciated fourteen factors that should be considered in assessing whether novel
scientific evidence is helpful and therefore admissible:
1. The potential rate of error;
2. The existence and maintenance of standards;
3. The care with which the scientific technique has been employed and whether it is
susceptible to abuse;
4. Whether there are analogous relationships with other types of scientific techniques that
are routinely admitted into evidence;
5. The presence of failsafe characteristics;
6. The expert's qualifications and stature;
7. The existence of specialized literature;
8. The novelty of the technique in its relationship to more established areas of scientific
analysis;
9. Whether the technique in question has been generally accepted by experts in the
field... ;
10. The nature and breadth of the inference adduced;
11. The clarity with which the technique may be explained;
12. The extent to which basic data may be verified by the court and jury;
13. The availability of other experts to evaluate the technique; and
14. The probative significance of the evidence.
69 C.C.C.3d at 415. The court added that if the proffered evidence satisfies that test, the court should then
perform an analysis similar to that required by American Federal Rule of Evidence 403. The court
recognized that there is no rule 403 counterpart in any Canadian statute or regulation, but it found that a
trial court possesses a residual discretion to reject evidence that is more prejudicial than probative. Id. at
417.
131. Id. at 418. For an even longer list of factors courts should consider, see Paciocco, Evaluating,
supra note 99, at 313-18.
132. 73 C.C.C.3d 348 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. 1992).
133. These factors are:
1. Is the evidence likely to assist the jury in its fact-finding mission, or is it likely to
confuse and confound the jury?
2. Is the jury likely to be overwhelmed by the 'mystic infallibility' of the evidence, or will
the jury be able to keep an open mind and objectively assess the worth of the evidence?
3. Will the evidence, if accepted, conclusively prove an essential element of the crime
which the defense is contesting, or is it simply a piece of evidence to be incorporated
into a larger puzzle?
4. What degree of reliability has the proposed scientific technique or body of knowledge
achieved?
5. Are there a sufficient number of experts available so that the defense can retain its own
expert if desired?
6. Is the scientific technique or body of knowledge such that it can be independently tested
by the defense?
7. Has the scientific technique destroyed the evidence upon which the conclusions have
been based, or has the evidence been preserved for defense analysis if requested?
8. Are there clear policy or legal grounds which would render theevidence inadmissible
despite its probative value?
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that its list was not necessarily exhaustive and that the weight of each factor
would depend on the circumstances of each case.14
In R. v. S.S., 3' 5 a defendant in an incest case offered evidence
regarding "false memory syndrome." The New Brunswick provincial court
stated that it could use either of two possible tests to determine the
admissibility of such novel evidence: Frye or the "reasonable reliability" test.
The court, quoting liberally from Justice Wilson's dissent in Beland, found
that the latter test was preferred in Canada.' 36 Applying the reasonable
reliability test to the facts at issue, the court excluded the defendant's
evidence. 137
These lower court opinions did little to resolve the uncertainty in the
Canadian law of scientific evidence. The multipart standards suggested in
Johnston. and Melaragni were so manipulable that they were meaningless.
Moreover, while all the courts cited Justice Wilson favorably, they could not
agree on the proper rule for the admissibility of scientific evidence. The
Johnston court summarized the preferred test as a liberal "relevancy and
helpfulness test," while the S.S. court promoted a seemingly more
conservative "reasonable reliability" interpretation.
Furthering the confusion, a few other courts agreed with Justice Sopinka's
position in Lavallee and applied the Frye test. In an unpublished ruling in
1990, an Ontario trial court held that expert testimony is admissable only if
the "expertise that the witness purports to have [is] an expertise that is
recognized, generally received in the scientific community." " In 1993, the
Northwest Territories Supreme Court held that it would admit novel scientific
evidence only if it is reliable, relevant, and helpful to the trier of fact. 3 9
Although the court did not cite Frye, it held that the reliability of the scientific
evidence in question was demonstrated by the general acceptance of the
scientific techniques involved.'"




135. 144 N.B.R.2d 324 (1994).
136. Id. at 327-28.
137. Id. at 328-29.
138. R. v. Keenan Woodstock (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. Dec. 11, 1990) (Misener, J., oral ruling on voir
dire) (unreported), cited in Lussier, supra note 99, at 345-46; see also Gaudiuso v. Walker, 56 D.L.R.4th
355 (B.C.S.C. 1989) (because proffered expert evidence is not generally accepted, court will require strict
compliance with section 11 of Evidence Act); R. v. P., 15 C.R.4th 121, 131-32 (1992) (citing favorably
State v. J.Q., 599 A.2d 172 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1991), which excluded evidence regarding "Child
Sexual Abuse Accommodation Syndrome" as not meeting general acceptabilty test).
139. R. v. Lafferty, 80 C.C.C.3d 150 (N.W. T. Sup. Ct. 1993).
140. Id. at 165; cf. Beverly McLachlin, Paper Presented before Canadian Bar Association Civil
Litigation Section, Vancouver, Edmonton 16 (June 21-22, 1993), quoted in Paciocco, Evaluating, supra
note 99, at 318 (opining that "the best gauges of reliability are the fact that the theories on which [expert
opinion evidence] is founded are widely accepted throughout society and are based on rigorous and wide
empirical testing or observation") (alteration in original).
4. The Canadian Supreme Court's Latest Pronouncement on Scientific
Evidence: R. v. Mohan
With Canadian law regarding scientific evidence in chaos, the Canadian
Supreme Court had another opportunity to clarify the law in 1994. M In R.
v. Mohan,42 the Canadian Supreme Court considered the case of a
pediatrician charged with sexually assaulting his female patients. The accused
sought to call a psychiatrist to testify that a perpetrator of the offenses alleged
would be part of a limited group of "sexual psychopaths" who had certain
definable psychological profiles. The psychiatrist was to state that the
defendant's psychiatric profile did not fit within this group.
In determining the admissibility of this evidence, the court, speaking
through Justice Sopinka, first discussed the general framework for the
admissibility of expert evidence. Justice Sopinka held that the following
criteria must be considered: (1) relevance, (2) necessity in assisting the trier
of fact, (3) the absence of any exclusionary rule, and (4) the qualifications of
the expert. 43
With regard to the first criterion, Sopinka stressed that relevance is not
mere logical relevance, but legal relevance. Courts may exclude evidence that
is logically relevant if its probative value is outweighed by its prejudicial
effect, if its presentation involves an inordinate amount of time, or if its
potential to mislead the trier of fact is out of proportion to its reliability.'"
Sopinka defined the second criterion, assistance to the trier of fact, as
evidence that is likely to be outside the experience and knowledge of the trier
of fact.14' The final two criteria allow a court to exclude expert evidence if
the testimony would run afoul of another rule, or if the expert is
unqualified.'"
Thus, the Mohan court established legal relevance and assistance to the
trier of fact as the primary criteria for the admissibility of most expert
evidence and established, as the measure of relevance, a vague balancing test
similar to American Federal Rule of Evidence 403.
Yet despite the seemingly liberal thrust of the criteria he announced in
Mohan, Sopinka applied a reliability test with a significant general acceptance
141. The law of British Columbia with regard to scientific evidence is another example of this chaos.
In R. v. Dieffenbaugh, 80 C.C.C.3d 97 (B.C. Ct. App. 1993), the court considered various possible tests
including "relevancy and helpfulness," "trustworthiness," Charles McCormick's "relevancy test," a
"hybrid" test turning on the type of evidence and the context of its use, the Federal Rules of Evidence,
and the "beyond the ken of the jury" test. Ultimately, the court, while not explicitly adopting a particular
test, rejected the relevancy test alone "because the law has long recognized that there will often be cases
where relevant evidence will not be admitted in a criminal prosecution where its probative value is
outweighed by its prejudicial effect." 80 C.C.C.3d at 108; accord R. v. Baptiste, 88 C.C.C.3d 211 (B.C.
App. 1994); see also R. v. Singh, 23 W.C.B.2d 558 (B.C. S.C. 1993) (holding that test for admissibility
of novel scientific evidence is relevancy, reliability, and helpfulness).
142. 89 C.C.C.3d 402 (1994).
143. Id. at 411.
144. Id. at 411-13.
145. Id. at 413-14, citing R. v. Turner, 60 Crim. App. 80, 83 (1974) (Eng.).
146. Id. at 414.
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component to the facts before the court. 47 Sopinka wrote that "[t]he trial
judge should consider the opinion of the expert and whether the expert is
merely expressing a personal opinion or whether the behavioural profile which
the expert is putting forward is in common use as a reliable indicator of
membership in a distinctive group." 148 In other words, Sopinka explained,
the court "must consider whether the scientific community has developed a
standard profile for the offender who commits this type of crime." 49 "An
affirmative finding on this basis will satisfy the criteria of relevancy and
necessity and.make the evidence admissible" if the expert is testifying within
her expertise.' 50
Applying this test, Sopinka found that the defendant's expert provided no
evidence indicating any "general acceptance" of the expert's theory that
people who commit sexual assault on young women necessarily possess
distinguishing behavioral characteristics. Sopinka added that he discovered no
material in the record to support a finding that the profile of a pedophile or
psychopath has been standardized. Therefore, continued Sopinka, the expert's
group profiles were not sufficiently reliable to be considered helpful to the
jury. Sopinka concluded that absent sufficient indicia of reliability, the
evidence could not be deemed helpful to the jury nor its value be said to
outweigh its potential for misleading or diverting the jury.' 5'
Sopinka's opinion did not cite any American case law on the issue of the,
admissibility of scientific evidence. Nevertheless, one scholar has argued that
"[t]he court in Mohan appears to have arrived at the same position as the
court in Daubert, though with decidedly less fanfare" because of the opinion's
focus on the underlying validity of expert evidence. 5 The opinion's heavy
reliance on general acceptance, however, seems to be inspired by Frye more
than Daubert.
In any event, any suggestion that Mohan has established Daubert, Frye,
or any other grand test for the admissibility of expert testimony that would
clarify the law* of scientific evidence in Canada is probably based on wishful
thinking. Sopinka was not attempting to establish a universally applicable rule,
as was done in those two cases. Rather, he stated explicitly that the question
before the court was how to apply broad, general criteria of relevance and
helpfulness to a particular type of evidence. The enunciated general
acceptance standard therefore apparently applies only to evidence of
147. Sopinka's opinion dovetails nicely with an article written by David Paciocco of the University
of Ottawa. Paciocco criticized the relevance and helpfulness test apparently supported by Justice Wilson's
dissent in Beland as "remarkably uninstructive" by itself. Paciocco, Evaluating, supra note 99, at 310.
The test, however, is useful "when it is appreciated that the inquiry is to be focussed intently on the
integrity of the expert process that is being presented as evidence." Id. at 311. Properly applied, added
Paciocco, the relevance and helpfulness test "involves a broad assessment of reliability, utility and
prejudice as well." Id. at 312.
148. Mohan, 89 C.C.C.3d at 423.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 424.
152. R.J. Delisle, TheAdnissibilityofExpertEvidence:A New Caution Based on General Principles,
29 C.R.4th 267, 272 (1994).
psychiatric profiles.153 In other areas, Canadian courts apparently have
extremely broad discretion.
The early indications are that Mohan has not done much to clarify the
standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence in Canada. In R. v.
T. ,154 an Ontario trial court applied Mohan to the issue of the admissibility
of expert testimony regarding repressed memory syndrome. The court
acknowledged that Mohan requires a court to determine "whether there exists
an acceptable body of evidence or acceptance of the theory to objectively
validate the opinion."" 55 But the court added that it did not read Mohan as
adopting Frye, a test which, according to the court, "has spawned an
immeasurable amount of litigation and criticism."156 Frye, continued the
court, "has never achieved a precedential foothold in Canadian law" and "is
neither consistent with the approach in Mohan" nor with other recent
Canadian cases. 157 The court added incorrectly"5 ' that "in the United
States, [Frye] has largely been overtaken by case law" and statutory rules of
evidence. 159
Instead of Frye, the court found that the test for the admissibility of
scientific evidence "should be a flexible one exploring the existence of indicia
of reliability and trustworthiness."160 The court noted that "there is a
continuum of reliability in matters of science from near certainty in physical
sciences to the far end of the spectrum inhabited by junk science and opinion
akin to sorcery or magic."6" In order to balance properly the danger of
admitting unreliable evidence against the potential for excluding helpful,
reliable evidence, the court adopted the standards suggested by the United
States Supreme Court in Daubert:
Whether the technique can be demonstrably tested, the existence of peer review for the
theory or technique, the existence of publication, the testing or validation employing control
and error measurement, and some recognition or acceptance in the relevant scientific field
all contribute to an assessment of the reliability of the opinion. 6
The court then ignored all these Dadbert factors and applied a liberal
relevancy test instead. It admitted the challenged evidence because "[the]
153. If there is any doubt that this is what Sopinka intended, it should be dispelled by this quotation
from the evidence book he co-authors:
The judicial experience in the United States demonstrates that a judicial standard for
admissibility is problematic. To date, Canadian courts have not attempted to formulate a single
rule for the admissibility of new scientific evidence. Rather, the courts first apply the
traditional exclusionary rules, the expert evidence rule, and then invoke policy reasons specific
to the particular proffered evidence to determine admissibility. This appears to be the
preferable route.
SoPInKA ET AL., supra note 99, at 597.
154. No. 4961/94, 1994 Ont. C. J. LEXIS 4017 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div. Nov. 30, 1994).
155. Id. at *37.
156. Id.
157. Id. at *37-*38.
158. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing retention of Frye in several important
American jurisdictions).
159. 1994 Ont. C.J. LEXIS 4017, at *37.
160. Id. at *38.
161. Id.
162. Id. at *38.
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doctor's opinions are founded in clinical experience and relevant academic
study."
63
In another case decided near the end of 1994164 that involved the
admissibility of DNA evidence, the New Brunswick Court of Appeals ignored
Mohan. Instead, the court - after rejecting the Frye rule t65 - stated that
"the law in Canada can be ascertained by looking at the test that the courts
have applied in cases involving novel scientific evidence. Fingerprint
evidence, evidence dealing with footprints, hair and fibre samples and other
scientific evidence such as chromatographs are admitted on the basis of
relevance. "66 The court concluded that "the science of DNA testing is
sufficiently credible to admit evidence from such tests when the particular
tests -themselves are relevant."'67 After reviewing the evidence proffered by
the prosecution, the court found that it was both "relevant and helpful" and
therefore admissible.'
68
The continued uncertainty in Canadian law regarding scientific evidence
suggests that Canadian jurisprudence would benefit significantly from a
Daubert-like decision that would suggest generally applicable criteria for
courts to use when confronted with a challenge to expert scientific testimony.
The Canadian Supreme Court should in fact improve on Daubert by giving
lower courts more guidance regarding how to apply such criteria in actual
cases. Unfortunately, the Canadian Supreme Court appears to favor deciding
the admissibility of scientific evidence on a case-by-case basis depending on
what it sees as the equities of the situation. 169
B. The Law of Scientific Evidence in Australia
Australia has had perhaps the most vociferous debate over scientific
evidence outside the United States. The traditional relevancy test in Australia
came under attack after prosecutors misused scientific evidence in winning
several convictions. Australian common law has moved gradually toward an
American model of requiring that scientific evidence be generally accepted as
reliable before it can be admitted in court. Indeed, American case law and
commentary on scientific evidence have directly influenced Australian law.
Australians have not always understood American law, however, and have had
trouble interpreting the Frye general acceptance test in particular.
Meanwhile, the limited Australian momentum toward stricter scrutiny of
scientific evidence is threatened by a new federal evidence code. The
163. Id. at *54.
164. R. v. Legere, 95 C.C.C.3d 139 (N.B. Ct. App. 1994).
165. Remarkably, the court relied heavily on Mark McCormick's outdated article in rejecting Frye
to the exclusion of much more recent and currently influential American scholarship. Id. at 150-51.
166. Id. at 151.
167. Id. at 152.
168. Id. at 158.
169. The court is known for its sympathy with feminist perspectives on law. See, e.g., R. v. Butler,
89 D.L.R.4th 449, 479, 482 (1992) (upholding antipornography statute based on feminist theory that
pornography harms women). This sympathy .may in some cases affect its jurisprudence on scientific
evidence. When the court wanted to admit evidence regarding battered woman syndrome in R. v. Lavallee,
55 C.C.C.3d 97 (1990), it applied a liberal test. But when it wanted to exclude evidence that might help
an accused molester in R. v. Mohan, [19941 2 S.C.R. 9, it adopted a stricter test.
scientific evidence provision of this code is heavily influenced by American
attitudes toward the admissibility of scientific evidence circa 1985, just before
the strict scrutiny trend in the United States began. Due to the scholarly work
of Ian Freckelton and others, however, Australians have become much more
knowledgeable about American law. It seems only a matter of time before this
knowledge, combined with simmering outrage at cases involving a miscarriage
of justice, manifests itself in a clear trend toward strict scrutiny of scientific
evidence.
1. The Misintroduction of the Frye General Acceptance Test Into
Australia
An Australian case that preceded Frye adopted the general acceptance
standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence. In R. v. Parker,170 the
court held that fingerprint evidence could be admissible if the theory at issue
was "generally recognized by scientific men." This case did not receive much
attention in the ensuing years, however.
1 71
By the late 1950s, Australian law began to move toward an "organized
field of expertise test" for the admissibility of expert testimony. In 1956, the
High Court of Australia held that before expert evidence may be admitted, the
party proffering the evidence must show that it is based on special study by,
or knowledge of, a qualified expert.172 In 1960, Justice Dixon of the High
Court of Australia wrote that any evidence from a qualified expert that could
be probative is admissible if two conditions are met. First, the substance of
the testimony must be beyond the common knowledge of the trier of fact, and,
second, the expert's testimony must be gleaned from an organized field of
knowledge."7 According to one influential treatise, an expert witness's
opinion should be admitted even if he put forward an unproven theory not
accepted by the weight of scientific opinion.74 In the criminal context,
however, the trial judge had discretion to exclude evidence whose probative
value was substantially outweighed by its prejudicial impact. 7
170. 1912 V.L.R. 152, 154.
171. lan R. Freckelton, Science and the Legal Culture, 2 EXPERT EVIDENCE. 107, 109 (1993).
Freckelton, whose work has been very influential in Australia, is a prominent Australian barrister and
author of a treatise on expert evidence.
172. Transport Publishing Co. v. Literature Bd. of Rev., 99 C.L.R. 111, 119 (1956).
173. Clark v. Ryan, 103 C.L.R. 486, 491 (1960) (opinion of Dixon, J.); accord Burger King
Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, 128 C.L.R. 417 (1973); Mattioli v. Parker, Q.R. 499 (1973).
174. CRoss ON EVIDENCE § 29060, at783 (4th Austl. ed. 1991). Cross cites Commissionerfor Gov't
Transp. v. Adamcik, 106 C.L.R. 292 (1961), a case involving marginal medical testimony that a plaintiff's
leukemia was caused by physical trauma. Adamcik provides dubious support for this rule. First, the case
involved the standard for the sufficiency of scientific evidence, not its admissibility. The admissibility of
the evidence in question was apparently never raised. Second, three of the four judges on the court
expressed their willingness to vacate the opinion below. However, because the appellant had asked for a
reversal, not a new trial, these three judges felt constrained to affirm. Id. at 301 (Taylor, J.), 303
(Menzies, J.), 307-08 (Windeyer, J.). Nevertheless, Adamcik has been cited for the proposition that at least
in civil cases, "it is well established that any witness qualified as an expert by the possession of the
relevant degrees may be permitted to propound medical theories even of bizarre curiosity." Gordon
Samuels, Is This the Best We Can Do?, 25 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC Sci. 3, 6 (1993). Gordon Samuels is a
judge sitting on the Court of Appeal, Supreme Court of New South Wales.
175. Freckelton, supra note 171, at 109.
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The law began to change in the late 1970s, when Australian prosecutors
began to rely on novel forensic techniques to secure convictions. As in the
United States, the exponential growth of forensic science began to shake up
the previously somnolent law of expert evidence.
The Australian common law began rather inadvertently to return to the
general acceptance test in 1977. In R. v. Gilmore,76 the New South Wales
Court of Criminal Appeal considered the admissibility of spectrographic voice
analysis. The court, relying on Australian precedent, held that it had the
authority to consider "both the question of whether or not a particular witness
qualifies as an expert, and the question of whether the field in respect of
which his evidence is sought to be tendered is such as to be properly the
subject of expert testimony."" 7 Looking to the development of the field in
the United States, the court found that voice spectrography "is a recognized
field in which a properly qualified expert can give admissible evidence."
178
The Gilmore opinion relied heavily on the Fourth Circuit opinion in
United States v. Bailer to support its judgment. 179 The opinion, as cited in
Gilmore,'"0 gave several examples of how the district court "adequately
guarded against dangers inherent in the use of newly developed scientific
tests,"' including ensuring the expertise of the witness, holding a voir dire
on a test's probative value, checking the availability of other experts, and
giving limiting instructions to the jury.' None of the examples mentioned
general acceptance.
The Gilmore court stated that "the approach laid down in [Bailer] is that
which should also be regarded as correctly stating the approach to be adopted
in this State.""' Thus, Gilmore was perfectly consistent with prior
Australian common law. It essentially applied a "recognized field" of
expertise test and then cited Bailer for the proposition that courts should take
steps to ensure that scientific evidence is not presented to the jury in a way
that would render it more prejudicial than probative. Gilmore did not in any
way adopt Frye.1s4
Confusion on this point arose, however, because later in its opinion the
Gilmore court referred to Commonwealth v. Lykus, 185 a case from the
Supreme Judical Court of Massachusetts finding that voiceprint evidence had
met the test of general acceptability as required by Frye."8 6 In context, it is
176. 2 N.S.W.L.R. 935 (1977).
177. Id. at 938-39.
178. Id. at 939.
179. 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975).
180. See Gilnore, 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 939-40.
181. Bailer, 519 F.2d at 466.
182. Id. at 466-67.
183. Gilmore, 2 N.S.W.L.R. at 939.
184. In fact, at least one prominent American commentator has associated a test similar to that
adopted in Gilmore with the liberal relevancy test advocated by Professor Charles McCormick. Edward
Cleary, one of the reporters of the Federal Rules of Evidence, stated that common law experience suggests
that the relevancy provisions of Federal Rules 401 to 403 could be applied to "purportedly scientific
evidence in an insufficiently established field." Edward W. Cleary, Preliminary Notes on Reading the
Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REV. 908, 916 (1978).
185. 327 N.E.2d 671, 678 (1975).
186. Gilmore, 2 N.S.W.L.R. (Mass.) at 940.
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clear that the Gilmore court did not intend this citation to be construed as
supportive of Frye."7 In fact, on the next page of its opinion, the court
repeated its belief that the cautionary observations in Bailer quoted above "are
an adequate safeguard" against the misuse of expert testimony.'88
Nevertheless, some commentators read Gilmore as adopting the Frye
test.'89 Because Gilmore clearly applied a "recognized field of expertise"
test as the primary screening mechanism for expert testimony, commentators
confused the field of expertise test with the Frye rule, though they are at best
distant cousins. 9 ' In other words, commentators read an opinion that
mentioned Frye in passing as adopting Frye, and then assumed that Frye is
synonymous with the field of expertise test applied by the court. This
confusion occured partly because of the lack of Australian familiarity with
Frye and partly because the commentators simply did not read the Gilmore
opinion (or the opinions it cited) carefully.' 9 ' One also gets the impression
that some wily commentators saw Gilmore as an opportunity to tighten the
Australian law of scientific evidence by importing the stricter American Frye
rule, even if diluted by the field of expertise criterion.
In any event, the Frye cat was out of the bag. As Frye began to receive
more attention in the United States, it also began to attract attention and create
controversy in Australia. In 1981, a New South Wales district court combined
the Frye and reliability tests when it looked to the "proved or accepted basis"
of polygraphy in order to determine the admissibility of expert testimony. 92
Other courts, however, continued to apply versions of the field of expertise
test. 193
2. The Effect of the Miscarriage of Justice Cases
Meanwhile, public concern over the potential misuse of scientific
evidence was growing, particularly after the miscarriage of justice that
187. The court also explicitly disavowed the reliability test, stating that "[to] recognize... a degree
of risk of inaccuracy and to recognize a need for caution in the use of the evidence, is far from treating
the evidence as inadmissible." Id. at 941.
188. Id.
189. See infra notes 217-18 and accompanying text.
190. Some American jurisdictions have adopted a form of a field of expertise test for the
admissibility of nonscientific expert evidence. GRAHAM, supra note 15, § 702.4, at 629, 632; John W.
Strong, Language and Logic in Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function,
Reliability, and Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 369 n.86 (1992).
191. One article states that the Gilmore court "was aware of the Frye doctrine and used words
reminiscent of the Frye test." Paul Giugni, Runjanjic v. R., 14 SYDNEY L. REV. 511, 514 (1992). The
latter part of that statement is at best debatable. The same article states that the Baller court "applied the
Frye test in determining the admissibility of expert evidence," which is simply not true. Id. at 514 n.24.
192. R. v. Murray, 7 A. Crim. R. 48, 49 (N.S.W. Dist. Ct. 1981). Because this case was decided
by a district court, it has minimal precedential value. Letter from Ian R. Freckelton, Australian evidence
scholar, to author (July 4, 1995) (on file with author).
193. In R. v. McHardie, 2 N.S.W.L.R. 733, 753 (1983), for example, the New South Wales Court
of Criminal Appeal held that expert testimony is admissible if it has its basis in a "field of knowledge."
Id. at 753. In R. v. Bonython, 38 S.A.S.R. 45 (1984) the court held that "the court may require... [that]
techniques or technology have a sufficient scientific basis to render results arrived at by that means to
render part of a field of knowledge which is a proper subject of expert evidence." Id. at 47 (quoted in R.
v. Jarrett, 1994 Austl. S.A.S.C. LEXIS 64, at *32-*34).
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occurred in the Splatt case. '94 The Splatt case arose out of the brutal murder
of an elderly woman in December, 1977. A jury convicted Edward Charles
Splatt of the murder. Splatt spent several years in jail, while consistently
maintaining his innocence. After a public campaign for a review of his
conviction, a Royal Commission was appointed to review the evidence. The
Report of the Royal Commission found reasonable doubt regarding the validity
of the scientific evidence used to convict Splatt, and he was released.
9 5
The Splatt controversy was followed by one of the most controversial
cases in Australian history, R. v. Chamberlain,96 better known as the Dingo
Baby Case. 197 While on a camping trip, Alice Lynne Chamberlain claimed
to have seen a dingo (a wild dog) carrying something off near her tent. She
soon realized the dingo was holding her baby, and witnesses confirmed that
she cried out, "My God, My God. A .dingo has got my baby." Neither the
dingo nor the baby was found, but the baby's clothes were recovered.
The government eventually charged Mrs. Chamberlain with murder. The
prosecution claimed that she cut her baby's throat in the family car and that
later that evening Mrs. Chamberlain or her husband took the body from the
car and buried it in sand nearby. Subsequently, according to the prosecution,
one or both Chamberlains disinterred the body, cut the fabric of the baby's
garments to simulate damage by a dingo, and removed the clothing and placed
it in a pile.
At trial, both parties presented complex and contradictory scientific
evidence on contested issues such as the origins of the cuts on the baby's
garments, the ability of a dingo to carry a baby, and what appeared to be
blood stains found on the baby's clothing and in the defendants' car. At the
end of the trial, the court essentially told the jurors that if they did not
comprehend the scientific evidence, they could decide the case based on their
common sense and how convincing they found the experts:
Merely because you can't fully understand the techniques and methods employed in modem
scientific research, doesn't mean you can't act on the evidence.... Of course, you can.
In the long run, it will depend on your assessment of the witness as to how he or she
appeals to you in the course of your inquiry, and you are therefore entitled ... to look at
the demeanour, the manner in which the evidence was given, and utilize your commen [sic]
sense judgment as to the extent, if any, you rely on this evidence."'
The jury convicted Mrs. Chamberlain.' 99
194. See Judy Bourke, Misapplied Science: Unreliability in Scientific Test Evidence (pt. 1), 10
AUsTL. B. REV. 123, 132-34 (1993) (relying on THE ROYAL COMMSION REPORT CONCERNING THE
CONVICTION OF EDWARD CHARLES SPLATT (THE SHANNON REPORT)(1984)).
195. Id.
196. 51 A.L.R. 225 (1984).
197. For details on this case, see KEN CRISPIN, THE DINGO BABY CASE (1987); IAN R.
FRECKELTON, THE TRIAL OF THE EXPERT 159-64 (1987); Paul Gerber, Playing Dice With Expert
Evidence: The Lessons to Emerge From Regina v. Chamberlain, 147 MED. J. AUSTL. 243, 243 (1987).
198. R. v. Chamberlain, 46 A.L.R. 493, 505 (1983).
199. Dean C.R. Williams of Monash University Law School notes that "it is likely that in many
cases juries faced with [conflicts in expert evidence] resort to reliance upon irrelevant considerations such
as which experts appear the more confident and self-assured." The court's instructions in Chamberlain
encouraged this tendency. C.R. Williams, Evidence and the Expert Witness, 26 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCI.
3, 6 (1994); see also Roberts, infra note 237, at 788 ("[Ajdversarial criminal practice invites the court to
evaluate scientific evidence by reference to scientifically irrelevant criteria, such as the expert's physical
On appeal, a two-judge majority rejected a challenge to the jury
instructions quoted above, and compounded the trial court's errors by focusing
on the personalities of the experts, rather than concentrating on apparent
problems with the scientific evidence. After accusing the two principal defense
expert witnesses of exhibiting "an unbecoming arrogance," the majority
affirmed the conviction.2' On appeal to the High Court, a majority once
again affirmed - this time over a vigorous dissent by Justice Murphy, who
severely criticized the prosecution's scientific evidence. 1
Possible flaws in the government's scientific evidence, and the
unscientific nature of the inquiry, shocked the Australian scientific
community. In 1984, thirty-four Australian scientists signed a joint statement
expressing serious doubts about the prosecution's blood evidence. In 1985, the
Chamberlain Innocence Committee presented fresh evidence to the Northern
Territory Attorney General that the baby's jumpsuit was cut by a dingo's
teeth. The Committee's presentation also cast doubt on the blood evidence.
The embarrassed government ordered a Royal Commission to investigate the
possible misuse of forensic science by the prosecution. 2
The Splatt and Chamberlain cases "demonstrated to both the [Australian]
legal fraternity and the community at large that the growth of the forensic
science industry has brought many uncertainties with it."203 Because of the
dearth of tort cases relying on scientific evidence in Australia, litigation had
not generated the specialist experts (such as those practicing in the United
States) who brazenly publicize their controversial skills.2' Perhaps that is
why Splatt and Chamberlain were so shocking. The two cases led to
widespread condemnation in Australia of the use of unreliable forensic
evidence.
appearance, accent, or communication skills.").
200. Chamberlain v. R., 72 F.L.R. 1, 30 (Fed. Ct. N..Terr. 1983); see Gerber, supra note 197, at
246. Similarly, in Wells v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 615 F. Supp. 262, 267 (N.D. Ga. 1985), aff'd
in part, modified in par, 788 F.2d 741 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986), the judge, sitting
as trier of fact, noted that he did not like the demeanor and tone of the defendants' experts and awarded
over $5 million to a plaintiff who alleged that a spermicide caused her child's birth defect. However, in
Wiechmann v. Levering & Workover Corp., 59 S.A. St. R. 203, 204 (1992), a South Australian court
held that demeanor should be of little importance in resolving conflicts between well qualified experts.
Rather, courts must assess the probability that each side is correct. For an explanation of why courts
should not give weight to a scientific expert's demeanor, see David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of
Expert Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2145-47
(1994).
201. Chamberlain v. R., 153 C.L.R. 521, 569 (1984) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
202. See ROYAL COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO CHAMBERLAIN CoNVICTIONs, COMMONWEALTH
PARLIAMENT PAPER No. 192 (1987).
203. MALCOLM BROWN & PAUL WILSON, JUSTICE & NIGHTMARES: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF
FORENSIC SCIENCE 3 (1992). Brown and Wilson's book attracted a great deal of publicity. See Peter
McGauran, Community Perceptions of Forensic Science: Resisting the Backlash, 24 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC
Sci. 82, 82, 84 (1992) (noting success of book).
204. See BROWN & WILSON, supra note 203, at 899; see also McGauran, supra note 203, at 85
("We are quite some considerable distance from countries like the USA, in which expert witnesses are
entrepreneurial and in which professional judgements are driven by the marketplace.").
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3. The Australian Law Reform Commission Report Favors a Relevancy
Test
In 1985, in the midst of the controversy over Chamberlain, the Australian
Law Reform Commission (ALRC), charged with recommending a new
evidence code, released an interim report. The report rejected Frye, as well
as any suggestion that expert opinion must be supported by a "reputable body
of opinion. " " The ALRC also rejected the reliability test, stating that
"[d]emonstrated lack of reliability ... goes not to admissibility ... but to the
weight .... Reliance is, therefore, placed upon the protections inherent in the
adversary conduct of trials and the nature of cross-examination."
206
The ALRC recommended that judicial discretion be limited to excluding
scientific evidence on the basis of the prejudicial effects that it may have, its
questionable reliability, and its tendency to mislead, confuse, or require undue
time and cost. The ALRC noted that under this test, if evidence is "liable
irrationally or incorrectly to affect court assessment of the evidence, the court
could also rule it to be inadmissible." 2" The ALRC added that evidence
could be excluded in exceptional cases."'
After a period for comments, the ALRC issued its final report. The report
observed that the ALRC received many objections from those who felt that
courts should restrict expert testimony, particularly by adopting the Frye
rule.2" But the Commission continued to reject Frye. It maintained that
"expert testimony cannot be excluded simply because it relates to new areas,
conflicts with other expert testimony or because it is difficult to comprehend.
If it could be, the courts would lag behind community knowledge."210
Another important Australian critic of both Frye and the reliability test
was attorney Ian Freckelton, author of the seminal work on the Anglo-
Australian law of scientific evidence, The Trial of the Expert.21' Freckelton
argued that
[t]he courtroom is not the proper forum to determine the reliability or validity of a scientific
technique, nor is it the right venue to assess whether controversy within the scientific
community has subsided sufficiently for the technique or theory to be accounted as receiving
general or even substantial acceptance within that community.
212




209. 38 AUSTL. LAW REFORM COMM'N, FINAL REPORT, EVIDENCE 83 (1987)
210. 38 Id.; see also P. Gillies, Opinion Evidence, 60 AUSTL. L.J. 597 (1986) (criticizing general
acceptance test).
211. FRECKELTON, supra note 197.
212. FRECKELTON, supra note 197, at 172. The point Freckelton misses is that courts inevitably
weigh the reliability and validity of scientific techniques. The question is whether there should be an initial
pretrial hearing on the evidence where the court can make a reasoned determination as to its validity, or
whether the trier of fact will have the sole burden of evaluating scientific evidence in the midst of a trial.
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4. Strict Scrutiny Gains Momentum
Just before Freckelton's book was published, the Royal Commission
established to look into the use of scientific evidence in Chamberlain
published its report. The report presented detailed criticisms of the scientific
evidence used to convict Mrs. Chamberlain.213 Acting on the advice of the
Commission, in 1988 the Northern Territory Court of Appeal ordered that
Mrs. Chamberlain be freed.214
The Royal Commission's work gave new momentum to those favoring
stricter rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence. One author wrote in
the Medical Journal of Australia that because only experts are entitled to give
opinion evidence, just as the legal system has a "best evidence" rule for
documents, it should create a "best expert" requirement for expert
testimony." 5 Without such a requirement, he fumed, "anyone whose name
is on the medical register becomes an instant expert, and is entitled to proffer
opinion evidence on any medical subject."216
One stumbling block on the road to a stricter test for the admissibility of
scientific evidence was that Australians were confused about what such a rule
might look like. Some Australian commentators continued to argue that the
"organized branch of knowledge" or "field of expertise" test is a version of
the Frye rule.2"7 Other commentators are unsure whether the test is a
version of the Frye rule.2" 8
213. The report, as summarized by Freckelton, found the following flaws in the scientific evidence
in Chamberlain: (1) use of tests without confirmatory analysis to verify the results; (2) failure to use
adequate controls; (3) testing on articles of evidence from which a clear result could not be expected, and
failure to use a control in such circumstances; (4) failure to test the antifoetal hemoglobin antiserum before
using it; (5) use of an antiserum produced as a research product when it had been made clear by its
manufacturer that its diagnostic significance was limited and should be established by interested scientists
working in clinical laboratories; (6) failure to take adequate account of the effects of denaturing from the
heat in the car and the effluxion of time when interpreting test results; (7) excessively hasty testing; (8)
employment of tests by scientists relatively inexperienced in performing them without adequate guidance
from a more experienced scientist; (9) destruction of testing material without even recording the results
photographically; (10) absence of a system for cross-checking results and procedures; (11) readiness to
"speculate" rather than be confined by the available data; (12) descent into partiality by some of the
scientists; (13) preparedness of some witnesses to go beyond their areas of expertise; (14) unpreparedness
of forensic scientists to consult each other. Ian R. Freckelton, Of Blood, Babies and Bathwater, 17
ALTERNATIVE L.J. 10, 11 (1992).
214. Reference under S.433a of the Criminal Code, No. Ca2 of 1988 (N. Terr. Sept. 15, 1988).
215. Gerber, supra note 197, at 243.
216. Gerber, supra note 197, at 243
217. See, e.g., ANDREw L.C. LIGERTWOOD, AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE § 7.40, at 378 (2d ed. 1993).
One writer, for example, contended that the test incorporated the first part of the original Frye dicta,
where the court noted that at some point a "discovery crosses the line between the experimental and
demonstrable stages." Oliver P. Holdenson, The Admission of Expert Evidence of Opinion as to the
Potential UnreliabilityofEvidenceofVisual Identification, 16 MELB. U. L. REV. 521,541 (1988) (quoting
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
218. Ian R. Freckleton, Novel Scientific Evidence: The Challenge of Tomorrow, 3 AUSTL. BAR. REV.
243, 246-47 (1987) [hereinafter Freckelton, Novel]. However, Freckelton later associated the field of
expertise test with the Frye rule in Ian R. Freckelton, Expert Evidence and the Role of the Jury, 12 AUsTL.
B. REV. 73, 87-91 (1994) [hereinafter Freckelton, Expert].
The confusion over Frye is reflected, for example, in the commentary of one writer, who
acknowledged that "[t]his concept of a field of expertise is a great deal wider than [the] prerequisite of
general acceptance by a community of experts." Giugni, supra note 191, at 513. Yet, he added that it is
"unclear" whether the judgments applying a field of expertise test implement Frye. Id.
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As discussed above," 9 the field of expertise test originally developed
independently of the Frye rule. But if the "field of expertise" test can be
considered a relative of the Frye rule, it is a rather distant one that does not
match the predominant American interpretation of Frye."°
In any event, the Australian cases adopting the field of expertise test are
sufficiently vague that they "advanced Australian jurisprudence only a very
short way because they leave unanswered the question of how the courts
should react to iconoclastic or state-of-the-art scientific views not shared by
most of the scientific community."" Since many Australians who favor
tighter standards for admitting scientific evidence look to Frye as a strict
American test that could be imported into Australian law, the fact that in
Australia Frye is sometimes associated with the liberal field of expertise test
is doubtlessly perplexing to them.m2
While some courts struggled with the field of expertise rule, 2' the Frye
general acceptance test gained momentum. 2 4 In R. v. Runjanjic,2 the
South Australian Court of Criminal Appeal reversed a trial court opinion
refusing to admit evidence of battered woman's syndrome on behalf of the
defendants, who argued that they acted under duress from their lovers. Chief
Justice King stated for the majority that an essential prerequisite to the
admission of expert evidence on the battered woman's syndrome was that "it
be accepted by experts competent in the field of psychology or psychiatry as
a scientifically established facet of psychology. "" King later favorably cited
a case from New York - a Frye jurisdiction - for the proposition that
219. See supra text accompanying notes 172-9 1.
220. See supra text accompanying notes 11-28 and 53-63 (discussing development of Frye in United
States). Some U.S. courts subsume a field of expertise analysis within a general acceptance analysis. See,
e.g., Hosford v. State, 560 So. 2d 163, 168 (Miss. 1990) ("Is the field of expertise one in which it has
been scientifically established that due investigation and study in conformity with techniques and practices
generally accepted within the field will produce a valid opinion?") (quoting House v. State, 445 So. 2d
815, 822 (Miss. 1984)).
221. Freckelton, supra note 171, at 109.
222. One reformer, concerned about abuses of scientific evidence such as those in the Chamberlain
case, argued that the field of expertise test should be separated from the Australian version of Frye, and
that proffered scientific evidence should meet both standards. He urged that the field of expertise test
should be a threshold inquiry. Gerber, supra note 197, at 244. If proposed testimony passes the field of
expertise test, the party bringing the testimony should also satisfy Frye by showing "that the tests which
have been applied have found general acceptance within the scientific community which specializes in that
area." Id. at 245.
223. In the wake of the Chamberlain scandal, courts that applied the field of expertise test tended
to apply other, more stringent tests as well. For example, in R. v. Runjanjic, 53 A. Crim. R. 362 (1991),
Justice Bollen, concurring, stated that "[e]xpert testimony is inadmissible if 'the state of the pertinent art
or scientific knowledge does not permit a reasonable opinion to be asserted even by an expert.'" id. at 372
(quoting McCoRMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13 (4th ed. 1987)). This was his interpretation of the "field of
expertise" test. But Justice Bollen also reviewed the evidence in question to ensure that its probative value
outweighed its prejudicial effect. Id. at 373. Meanwhile, in Casley-Smith v. FS Evans & Sons Party Ltd.,
49 S.A. St. R. 314, 320 (1988), the South Australia Supreme Court added a reliability and acceptance test
to the field of expertise rule. The court held that scientific evidence is admissible only if it is "sufficiently
organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge or experience." Id. at 320.
However, by citing Frye with approval later in its opinion, the Casley-Smith court confused matters. See
id. at 323.
224. Freckelton, Novel, supra note 218, at 246-47; Freckelton, supra note 171, at 110.
225. 53 A. Crim. R. 362, 362 (1991).
226. Id. at 366.
"recent findings of researchers in the field have confirmed... [the] presence
[of battered woman's syndrome] and thereby indicated that the scientific
community accepts its underlying premises."'n Although the opinion does
not cite Frye, Australian commentators have reasonably interpreted the
language in the opinion focusing on acceptance as adopting the Frye general
acceptance test.228
The Northern Territory Supreme Court, meanwhile, also adopted a Frye-
like test in R. v. Lewis."9 In Lewis, two experts for the prosecution argued
that they could identify bite marks allegedly made by the accused. The trial
court, in this case, admitted the evidence, and the jury convicted the
defendant. On appeal, Justice Muirhead, writing for the majority, held that
when the government intends to present novel scientific evidence, it has a duty
to "demonstrate its scientific reliability.""a According to Justice Muirhead,
the admissibility of bite evidence would be determined in light of the
"established universal view" regarding the reliability of the technique in
identifying bite marks. This test is actually stricter than Frye since it requires
universal, rather than general, acceptance.
Justice Maurice, concurring, explicitly relied on Frye. He argued that
"[w]here the evidence is of a comparatively novel kind, the... Crown...
should demonstrate its scientific reliability."" Maurice admitted that "[i]t
could not be asserted that the Frye test has become law in Australia."232 But
he added that Frye "provides a useful guideline in determining whether novel
forensic evidence should go before a jury.""
By 1990, Freckelton acknowledged the "increasingly strong indications"
that Frye was becoming the law of Australia." 4 He predicted that an
Australian court, in formulating criteria for the admission of DNA evidence,
would "borrow Frye language and focus upon the degree of dissension about
any new technique within the scientific community."a" However, another
writer, James Kearney, argued that while the Frye approach "is known in
Australia ... it could not be said to be the law in Australia."236 If the issue
227. Id. at 367 (citing People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358, 363 (N.Y. 1985)). For more on battered
woman's syndrome testimony in Australia, see Patricia W. Easteal, Battered Woman Syndrome:
Misunderstood?, 3 CURRENT ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 356 (1992); P.W. Easteal, Battered Woman Syndrome:
What is "Reasonable"?, 17 ALTERNATIVE L.J. 220 (1992); Ian Leader-Elliott, Battered But Not Beaten:
Women Who Kill in SelfDefense, 15 SYDNEY L. REV. 403 (1993); J. Stubbs, The (Un)reasonable Battered
Woman, 3 CONTEMP. ISSUES CRIM. JUST. 359 (1992).
228. See Ian R. Freckelton, Novel Psychological Evidence, in EXPERT EVIDENCE § 13.90 (Ian R.
Freckelton & Hugh Selby eds., 1993); Freckelton, Novel, supra note 218; Freckelton, supra note 171;
Giugni, supra note 191, at 513. In R. v. C., 60 S.A. St. R. 467 (1993), King reiterated that general
acceptance is a precondition of admissibility, though he avoided ruling on the issue in that case. Instead,
he held the evidence inadmissible on the ground that it was not "necessary" to help the trier of fact. Justice
Duggan continued to reject general acceptance in favor of the field of expertise test.
229. 29 A. Crim. R. 267 (S.C.N.T. 1987).
230. Id. at 271.
231. Id. (Maurice, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 269.
233. Id.
234. Ian R. Freckelton, DNA Profiling: Forensic Science Under the Microscope, 14 CRIM. L.J. 23,
30 (1990).
235. Id. at 31.
236. James T. Kearney, Genetic Identification: Not Always Watertight Evidence, 48 L. Soc'Y J. 48,
49 (1990).
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of DNA admissibility arose, "it would probably be decided by the discretion
to exclude otherwise admissible evidence if it would operate unfairly against
the accused." 7
As the debate over the admissibility of scientific evidence in Australia
proceeded, shock over Splatt and Chamberlain continued to reverberate.
Freckelton, for example, began to espouse a more conservative position on the
admissibility of scientific evidence. He noted that "[t]he system is not
structured in such a way that expert witnesses, particularly in the criminal
field, will regularly be subjected to rigorous cross-examination likely to test
the quality of the scientific work that they have undertaken or the propriety
of the protocols followed by them or their laboratory. " " Other
commentators, appalled by the results of the Chamberlain inquiry, and
concerned about other controversial cases in which the prosecution misused
forensic evidence, began to call for stricter scrutiny of scientific evidence.131
Despite the overall trend in both judicial decisions and legal scholarship
favoring strict scrutiny of scientific evidence in Australia, some courts
continued to apply a liberal field of expertise test. In 1993, the South
Australia Court of Criminal Appeal held that it was sufficient for the purposes
of approving admissibility that podiatry "is something in the nature of a
science which requires a course of study in order to obtain knowledge of
it."2' The defendant asked the court to apply Frye,24' but the court
237. Id. at 49. In R. v. Lucas, 2 V.R. 109, 115, 118 (1992) the court excluded DNA evidence
because there had been no foundational testimony given regarding the frequency of a match between DNA
found at the crime scene and the members of the general population. The court applied the traditional
discretionary test and found that the testimony lacked sufficient probative value compared with its possible
prejudicial effect. The court also held that scientific evidence "must have a basis in a body of recognised
scientific theory." It is not clear whether this test is best analogized to Frye or to the field of expertise test.
DNA evidence was admitted despite challenges in the unpublished cases of Cannon, No. 90/91/0245
(N.S.W.S.C. Aug 29, 1991); Brown, No. 22/1990 (Tas. S.C. June 20, 1990); R. v. Elliott, No.
707154/89 (N.S.W.S.C. April 6, 1990). Neil McLeod, English DNA Evidence Held Inadmissible, 1991
CRIM. L. REV. 583, 584. Bourke adds that DNA profiling has been used in many Australian cases without
objection from the defendant. Bourke, supra note 194, at 143 n.119; see also Henry Roberts, DNA
Profiling: Towards the Identification of Individuals, 25 AUSTL. J. FORENSIC SCt. 43 (1993).
238. Freckelton, supra note 213, at 10.
239. Justice Michael Kirby, the President of the Court of Appeal of New South Wales, Australia,
summarized the problems with expert testimony that the cases revealed:
Partisan expert evidence can do terrible wrongs in the forensic setting. The judge, as much
as the jury, will often be ignorant of the realm of discourse engaged in by the forensic expert.
The accused may not have equal access to the expertise in the possession of the Crown, simply
because of the repeated experience from which the expertise derives. Such experts may be too
close to the prosecution. They may lose their objectivity. Yet their very expertise may cloak
them with the appearance of professional neutrality. They may be over-confident in their skills
and of the 'science' they apply. Dependent on those who call them, they may unconsciously
take on their cause.
Michael Kirby, Miscarriages of Justice-Our Lamentable Failure?, COMMONWEALTH L. BULL., July
1991, at 1037, 1045-46. Similarly, after reviewing the miscarriage ofjustice cases, attorney Judy Bourke
wrote:
scientific test evidence is frequently misused in criminal trials because of its unreliability. The
heart of the problem lies in the fact that those charged with presenting and trying the facts of
a trial, whether judge, jury, counsel or solicitor, are unable to assess the accuracy of the test
results
Bourke, supra note 194, at 124.
240. Rose v. R., 69 Austl. Crim. Rep. 1, 10 (1993) (discussing Clark v. Ryan, 103 C.L.R. 486
(1960)).
241. Freckelton, Expert, supra note 218, at 89.
ignored this request and failed even to cite the case.
In June 1994, by contrast, the South Australia Supreme Court explicitly
adopted Frye in R. v. Jarrett.242 The court held that the procedures adopted
by witnesses for the prosecution in the implementation of PCR DNA tests
were admissible because they were "recognized by the scientific community
as reliable and have been developed to the stage whereby the results obtained
by them may be accepted with confidence." 43 The court rejected the
defendant's contention 2" that it should adopt the stricter, modern version of
the Frye rule formulated by the New York Court of Appeals in Castro.24
Under this version of Frye, the trial judge would have been obligated to
conduct a pretrial hearing to determine if the testing laboratory substantially
performed the scientifically accepted tests and techniques, yielding sufficiently
reliable tests to be submissible to the jury. 46 The Jarrett court held that
such issues are matters for the jury to decide.247
The court's handling of the Castro issue was hardly a model of judicial
craftsmanship. First, the court cited a series of cases that provided scant
support for its position. It relied on a thirty-three year old Australian case of
questionable relevance,24 and also cited the High Court of Australia opinion
upholding the Chamberlain conviction249 despite Mrs. Chamberlain's
ultimate acquittal. The court also relied heavily on the Bailer case," 0 which
had rejected Frye in favor of a liberal relevancy test. Bailer, a 1975 Fourth
Circuit case interpreting the Federal Rules of Evidence, was superseded by
Daubert. Yet the Jarrett court failed to discuss, or even cite, Daubert.
Second, none of the cases cited by the court adopted the Frye rule, and
242. 1994 Austl. S.A.S.C. LEXIS 64 (S.C.S.A. June 10, 1994).
243. Id. at *48. The defendant had initially asked the trial court to reject the evidence. He alleged
that the PCR method was new and untried, had not been accepted as reliable, and was highly susceptible
to contamination. However, the hearing on the evidence established, in the words of the supreme court,
that PCR DNA has crossed the line between "the experimental and demonstrable stages," Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), and is "part of a body of knowledge...
which is sufficiently organised or recognised to be accepted as a reliable body of knowledge"
by relevant scientists, namely molecular biologists.
Id. at *14.
244. Id. at *25:*26.
245. Australian commentators have praised Castro. Freckelton, supra note 213, at 11-13; Kearney,
supra note 236, at 49-52. Dr. Eric Magnusson of the Department of Chemistry, Australian Defense Force
Academy, argues that the criteria established in Castro "were nothing more than the minimum standards
which most scientists regarded as obligatory for a properly conducted investigation." Eric Magnusson,
Reasonable Doubt, Legal Doubt and Scientific Doubt, 26 AUsTL. J. FORENsIC Sm. 8, 9 (1994).
246. State v. Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d 985 (Sup. Ct. 1989). See supra text accompanying note 55
(discussing Castro).
247. Jarrett, 1994 Austl. S.A.S.C. LEXIS 64, at *26.
248. Id. at *31, citing Adamcik, 106 C.L.R. 292 (1961). In Adamcik, the court considered the
sufficiency of admitted evidence, not the admissibility of evidence. I may be overstating this point, since
sufficiency and admissibility determinations have often been conflated in Australia. But since Adamcik has
been such an influential opinion with regard to admissibility, we are faced with a classic chicken and egg
problem: Has erroneous conflation of admissibility and sufficiency determinations by jurists led to the
citation of Adamcik, which concerns sufficiency, in admissibility case? Or did repeated misciting of
Adancik in evidence treatises, as an admissibility (as well as a sufficiency) case, cause the conflation?
249. Jarrett.. 1994 Austl. S.A.S.C. LEXIS 64, *27 (citing Chamberlain v. R., 153 C.L.R. 521
(1984)).
250. Id. at *32 (citing United States v. Bailer, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir. 1975)).
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Bailer, as noted previously,"' implicitly rejected it. If the Jarrett court
found those cases persuasive, it should have rejected Frye and adopted a
liberal relevancy test. But once the court decided to adopt Frye, the cases it
cited provided no guidance as to whether the traditional or modern
interpretation of the rule is preferable. The court could have written a far
more persuasive opinion had it discussed the American cases accepting and
rejecting Castro's version of Frye. 2
The Frye test seems to be on its way to becoming the dominant test in
Australia. Judy Bourke, a Frye supporter, argues that "many Australian
lawyers think the Frye test is either part of Australian common law or, if not,
it should be." 3 Andrew Ligertwood, author of the treatise Australian
Evidence, confirms that "recent [Australian] state authority favours application
of the Frye test."' 4 Yet, because Australians have frequently misconstrued
the Frye test, it is not clear whether all Australian jurisdictions that have
purportedly adopted Frye would do so if they understood Frye's true nature.
Moreover, modern American Frye jurisdictions often apply the general
acceptance test to an expert's reasoning, an expansion of Frye that was
rejected in Australia in Jarrett. Meanwhile, what effect, if any, Daubert will
have on Australian case law remains to be seen. Freckelton notes that the
standards set forth in Daubert may be influential in Australian courts, 5 but
that "the Frye test seems inexorably destined to enter into the law of
Australia" to some degree. 6
251. See supra text accompanying notes 179-88.
252. See supra note 57 (listing cases accepting and rejecting Castro's version of Frye).
253. Bourke, supra note 194, at 145. Some Australian scientists support Frye as well. Magnusson,
supra note 245, at 9 ("[Truly professional forensic science recognises profession-wide standards of
professional practice and that it is against these standards that scientific evidence must be assessed.").
254. LIGERTWOOD, supra note 217, § 7.41, at 378. In contrast, the first edition of Ligertwood's
treatise, published in 1988, did not even mention Frye. ANDREW L.C. LIGERTWOOD, AUSTRALIAN
EVIDENCE § 7.41, at 300 (1st ed. 1988). Ligertwood, however, advocates a validity and reliability test for
scientific evidence. Confusing the field of expertise test with Frye, he argues against Frye. He argues that
a proposed witness's expertise in a generally accepted, recognized field should not necessarily qualify him
to testify. Rather, the witness must be able to help the jury. Therefore, for example, a dentist may practice
in a recognized field, but his testimony regarding bite mark identification, which is still an unrecognized
field, should not be admitted. Ligertwood also argues that DNA testing may be generally accepted, but
that the testing may be performed so badly in a particular case as to make the evidence too unreliable to
admit. LIGERTWOOD, supra note 217, § 7.42, at 379. Anticipating Daubert, he maintains that general
acceptance is but one indicium of reliability. Id. § 7.41, at 378. Bourke's commentary also anticipates
recent American developments. She criticizes Australian cases for focusing on only novel scientific
evidence, because scientific evidence can be unreliable even if it is not novel. Bourke, supra note 194,
at 142-46. In Daubert, the Supreme Court explicitly held that all scientific testimony, not just novel
testimony, must be screened for reliability. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2796
n.11 (1993).
255. Ian R. Freckelton, The Area of Expertise Rule, in EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 228 § 9.330;
see also Stephen J. Odgers & James T. Richardson, Keeping "Junk" Science Out of the Courtroom 17
(unpublished, undated manuscript on file with author) ("Daubert will reinforce the trend of authorities in
Australia.. . . [Tihe focus on reliability is likely to strike a chord in the development of the common law
in [Australia] . .. ").
256. Freckelton, supra note 255. As in the United States, scholars in Australia are debating whether
Daubert is more or less strict than Frye. Freckelton maintains that Daubert is "more demanding" because
it requires courts to focus on the validity of scientific evidence. Freckelton, Expert, supra note 218, at 90;
Freckelton, supra note 255 § 9.290. Dean C.R. Williams of Monash University, however, contends that
in Daubert "the United States Supreme Court took a major step in terms of rendering more expert
evidence admissible." Williams, supra note 199, at 5.
5. The Australian Evidence Code
In early 1995 the Australian parliament passed a new federal evidence
code that create new rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence. 7 It
is unclear how influential the new code of evidence will be. The federal courts
hear relatively few cases, and the Australian states are not obligated to adopt
the federal code. However, New South Wales has already adopted the code
in the form of the 1995 New South Wales Evidence Act, and litigants are
likely to cite it even where it has not been adopted.
Section 79 of the code provides that expert evidence is admissible if a
person "has specialized knowledge based on the person's training, study or
experience," and if the testimony "is wholly or substantially based on that
knowledge. ""
The Australian federal government commissioned two attorneys, Geoff
Bellamy and Peter Meibusch, to comment on the text of the Evidence Act in
the government's publication of the rules. Bellamy and Meibusch apparently
believe that section 79 establishes an extremely liberal rule for the
admissibility of expert testimony. In essence, they argue that if the evidence
is relevant and meets the requirements of the equivalent of Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, it is admissible. 9 This test reflects conventional wisdom in
Australian legal circles in the mid-1980s, when the Law Reform Commission
reported its proposals for dealing with the admissibility of scientific evidence
in an evidence code.260
Given the recent trend in Australia toward stricter scrutiny of scientific
evidence, courts in jurisdictions adopting the code may try to interpret section
79 creatively in order to avoid its liberal implications, much as American
courts did with rules 702 and 703 after passage of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.26' Like the Federal Rules of Evidence, the Australian Evidence
Code is sufficiently vague to allow such interpretations to thrive.
In fact, after urging that challenges to expert evidence be restricted to
situations in which the evidence is more prejudicial than probative, Bellamy
and Merbusch add in note 79.2 that "[t]he Law Reform Commission
considered that the discretion 'could be used to exclude evidence that has not
257. EVIDENCE ACT 1995, reprinted in CIVIL LAW Div., ATTORNEY GENERAL'S DEP'T,
COMMONWEALTH EVIDENCE LAW 5-194 (1995).
258. Id.
259. Note 79.1 refers the reader to the Law Reform Commission report for help in understanding
section 79. COMMONWEALTH EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 257, at 75. As discussed previously, see supra
notes 205-210 and accompanying text, that report rejected both the Frye rule and the reliability test. Note
79.2, meanwhile, states that "[t]here is no requirement that the knowledge upon which expert opinion
evidence is based must relate to a 'recognised field of expertise.'" COMMONWEALTH EVIDENCE LAW,
supra note 257, at 75. The note adds that the "relevance discretion in § 135 will enable courts to exclude
expert opinion evidence where its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger that it might
be misleading or confusing." Id. at 75-76.
Section 135 promulgates a test analogous to American Federal Rule of Evidence 403. Section 135
states that "[t]he court may refuse to admit evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the danger that the evidence might: (a) be unfairly prejudicial to a party; or (b) be misleading or
confusing; or (c) cause or result in undue waste of time." EVIDENCE AT 1995, supra note 257, § 135.
260. See supra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
261. See Freckelton, Expert, supra note 218, at 87.
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sufficiently emerged from the experimental to the demonstrable.' '262 This
language mirrors the Frye case263 and is arguably an implicit endorsement
of Frye, although Frye's language regarding general acceptance is not
cited.26
Moreover, section 79 is obviously based on American Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. Rule 702, once considered very forgiving, has been interpreted
strictly by the Supreme Court in Daubert. The seemingly innocuous word
"knowledge," for example, which appears in both rule 702 and section 79,
was interpreted in Daubert as "connot[ing] more than subjective belief or
unsupported speculation. The term 'applies to any body of known facts or to
any body of ideas inferred from such facts or accepted as truths on good
grounds.' . . . Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate
validation - i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known. "265 Already,
commentators have argued that Australian courts should use the "knowledge"
language in section 79 to import Daubert into Australian law.266
Finally, Australian courts could simply interpret section 135, which is
modeled on Federal Rule of Evidence 403, strictly in the context of expert
testimony, as advocated by Judge Weinstein with regard to rule 403. In
Daubert, the Supreme Court approved of the following comment by
Weinstein: "Expert evidence can be both powerful and quite misleading
because of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the judge in
weighing possible prejudice against probative force under rule 403 of the
present rules exercises more control over experts than over lay
witnesses." 267 Indeed, Freckelton argues that the Evidence Act "is geared
to give much greater prominence to the exclusionary mechanisms" in section
135.6 He adds that "[g]eneral acceptance and reliability certainly leap out
as contenders to breathe life into what can otherwise degenerate into relatively
meaningless incantations."269
Thus, Australian rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence may get
even more confused. Whether Australian courts will back away from the
apparently liberal intent of section 79 remains to be seen.
C. The Law of Scientific Evidence in New Zealand
Because New Zealand has a population of under four million, the body
of case law is relatively small and there is an attendant dearth of New Zealand
cases and commentary discussing scientific evidence. Nevertheless, the debate
over the proper standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence in New
262. COMMONWEALTH EVIDENCE LAW, supra note 257, at 76.
263. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
264. Cf. Freckelton, supra note 255 § 9.310 (predicting that Frye may survive enactment of evidence
code).
265. Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 2795 (1993) (citation omitted).
266. Odgers & Richardson, supra note 255, at 21.
267. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2798 (quoting Jack Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence
Is Sound; It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 632 (1991)).
268. Letter from Ian R. Freckelton, Australian evidence scholar, to author (July 4, 1995) (on file
with author).
269. Id.
Zealand has been interesting. As discussed below, New Zealand courts and
commentators have considered cases from all of the jurisdictions discussed in
this Article. The relevancy, reliability, field of expertise, and general
acceptance tests all have their supporters in New Zealand.
1. Frye in New Zealand
Like Australia, New Zealand has struggled with the Frye rule, and with
the differences between Frye and the field of expertise test. In R. v. B. ,270
a case alleging that the defendant committed incest and-indecent acts, a child
psychologist who had interviewed the complainant sought to testify as to the
complainant's credibility. The court applied the "field of expertise" test: "As
a precondition of admissibility the subject matter to which the expert opinion
relates must be a sufficiently recognised branch of science at the time the
evidence is given."271 A field of expertise will be recognized when
"research establishes the accuracy of knowledge in that field."272 The court
refused to let the child psychologist testify because it found that experts in that
field could not prove as matters of expert observation that "persons subjected
to sexual abuse demonstrate certain characteristics or act in peculiar ways
which are so clear and unmistakable that they can be said to be concomitants
of sexual abuse." 2 3
The Court thus applied a strict version of the field of expertise test by
narrowly construing the relevant field. Instead of defining the relevant field
as child psychology, the court instead defined the field as expertise in
determining the behavior or characteristics of victims of sexual abuse.
Two years later, in R. v. Accused,274 the court, following R. v. B.,
excluded psychological evidence.27 This evidence came from a school
guidance counselor concerning specific behavioral characteristics she
considered consistent with sexual abuse, i.e., "child sexual abuse
accommodation syndrome. "276
In 1991, the New Zealand Law Commission, which is charged with
making recommendations for possible amendments to New Zealand's evidence
code, released its paper on expert and opinion evidence.2' The Commission
noted that R. v. B. was the leading case on expert evidence in New
Zealand,27 and that the case established a possible counterpart to Frye when
it held that admissible scientific evidence must come from a "recognised
270. 1 N.Z.L.R. 362, 368 (C.A. 1987).
271. Id. at 367.
272. Id. at 367; cf. Ken Byrne, Allegations of Child Sexual Abuse and the Expert Witness: Common
Problems - Part I, AUSTL. FAM. LAW., June 1991, at 14, 16 ("There is no psychological test which
determines in a valid or reliable way, whether or not a child has been sexually abused.").
273. 1 N.Z.L.R. at 367.
274. 1 N.Z.L.R. 714 (C.A. 1989).
275. Id. at 720.
276. Id.
277. N.Z. LAW COMM'N PRELIMINARY PAPER No. 18, EVIDENCE LAW: EXPERT EVIDENCE AND
OPINION EVIDENCE (1991).
278. Id. at 20.
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branch of science."279 The Commission's proposition that this test is similar
to Frye and creates the same problems is debatable.28°
The Law Commission then engaged in a thorough analysis of whether
New Zealand should adopt the Frye rule. The Commission, citing American
sources including Giannelli28t and McCormick," 2 found that the Frye test
has been subject to considerable criticism in the United States.2"' The
Commission noted that because Frye focuses on acceptance in the scientific
community, much depends on whether the relevant community is defined
narrowly or broadly. Also, new possibly reliable evidence may not be
admissible, particularly when it is based on the theories of a single pioneering
expert in the field. "The effect of the rule is that new developments in science
are slow to appear in the courts. We therefore do not consider that the Frye
test is satisfactory."28 The Commission instead argued that a test should be
developed that is responsive to reliability concerns, but flexible enough to
cover a wide range of situations.28 5
The Commission concluded that code provisions should be enacted for the
admissibility of expert evidence that "focus directly on the value and
reliability of the testimony. "286 The Commission added that the Australian
Law Reform Commission and the American Federal Rules of Evidence
promoted two sound approaches. The ALRC advocated that expert testimony
be restricted only by a showing that the expert is qualified, and that judges
be given a general power to exclude unfairly prejudicial, confusing, or
misleading evidence.27 The Federal Rules, meanwhile, establish a liberal
"helpfulness to the fact-finder" rule.288
After seemingly endorsing extremely liberal tests for the admissibility of
scientific evidence, the New Zealand Law Commission switched gears. It
stated that a commitment to reliability underlies the approaches of both the
Federal Rules of Evidence and the ALRC.8 9 Unreliable expert opinion
clearly will be unhelpful under the Federal Rules approach, and can be unduly
prejudicial, misleading, or a waste of time under the ALRC's
279. Id. at 18 (quoting R. v. B., 1 N.Z.L.R. 362, 367 (1987)).
280. As noted previously, at note 220 and accompanying text, the Australian field of expertise test
and the Frye test are distant cousins. In R. v. B., the court defined the relevant field of expertise as
credibility of a particular psychological theory. Frye, of course, applies to a "theory or technique." Thus,
if New Zealand courts continue to define field of expertise as narrowly as in R. v. B., the test would be
analogous to Frye. It seems likely, however, that none of this crossed the court's mind, and that the court
defined the relevant field so narrowly in order to exclude unreliable evidence. See generally Confronting
the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 1496 (1995) (arguing that when test
for admissibility depends on relevant scientific community, courts can manipulate definition of
'community" to reach desired outcomes).
281. Giannelli, supra note 17.
282. MCCORMICK, supra note 16.
283. N.Z. LAW CoMM'N, supra note 277, at 18.
284. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 18.
285. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 18.
286. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 22.
287. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 22 (quoting 1 AUSTL. L. REFORM COMM'N,
EVIDENCE: INTERIM REPORT 416 (1985)).
288. N.Z. LAW CoMM'N, supra note 277, at 23.
289. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 23.
recommendations. 90 The New Zealand Commission then advocated a test
promoted at the time by American authors, such as Bert Black, who favored
restrictive policies toward expert evidence.9 ' According to the New Zealand
Commission, scientific evidence "must be assessed for scientific reliability,
including the validity of the underlying scientific theory and the reliability of
the procedures and techniques used in the particular case. "292 However, "the
theory need not be accepted by all or most scientists working in the relevant
area."293 In addition, "[o]bjectivity may also be an important facet for
reliability," particularly with regard to social science evidence.294 The
Commission concluded its confused discussion by stating that while it believed
that the Australian Law Reform Commission's test would be adequate, it
would be preferable to add the helpfulness test as a prophylactic. 95
New Zealand has not amended its evidence code to take into account its
Law Commission's conclusions. This is probably just as well, since those
conclusions are, as described above, rather incoherent.
2. Recent Developments in New Zealand
Meanwhile, the common law in New Zealand has continued to develop.
In 1993, one New Zealand court interpreted R. v. B. as establishing the
equivalent of a Frye test. In R. v. C. S. ,296 the court excluded evidence from
a psychologist concerning an alleged child sexual abuse victim's behavior
patterns as an adult. The court, relying on R. v. B., held that a psychologist
may not testify regarding human behavior unless the opinion is "firmly
founded upon accepted scientific research. "297
The following year, however, another High Court judge refused to apply
R. v. B. to the issue of whether complainants may testify regarding their
allegedly recovered memories of sexual abuse.29 Instead, the court applied
a liberal relevancy test that did not scrutinize the validity or general
acceptance of the theory that memories can be repressed and recovered years
later.299
Most recently, in R. v. Calder" the High Court of New Zealand,
Christchurch Registry, considered the admissibility of evidence that blood and
hair analyses of a decedent led "to the irresistable conclusion that he was
poisoned by acrylamide . 3 l Faced with contradictory New Zealand
precedents favoring the liberal relevancy, general acceptance, and field of
290.. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 23
291. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 24; see Black, supra note 3 (advocating a strict test
for the admissibility of scientific evidence focusing on reliability and validity).
292. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 24.
293. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 24.
294. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 24.
295. N.Z. LAW COMM'N, supra note 277, at 25.
296. 11 C.R.N.Z. 45 (H.C. 1993).
297. Id. at 47 (emphasis added).
298. R. v. R., 11 C.R.N.Z. 402, 405 (H.C. 1994).
299. Id.
300. No. 154/94 (N.Z.H.C. April 12, 1995).
301. Id. at 2.
1996] Junk Science
YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 21:123
expertise tests, the court turned to foreign law in an attempt to promulgate an
appropriate rule. The court considered the rules for admissibility of scientific
evidence in England, the United States, Australia, and Canada, as well as the
local New Zealand Law Commission Report.3"a After examining precedents
such as Robb," 3 Frye, Daubert, Lucas, Johnson, and Melaragni, the court
concluded that
[b]efore expert evidence, such as that in issue in this case, can be put before the jury by a
suitable qualified person it must be shown to be both relevant and helpful. To be relevant
the evidence must logically tend to show that a fact in issue is more or less likely. To be
helpful the evidence must pass a threshold which can conveniently be called the minimum
threshold of reliability. This means the proponent of the evidence must show that it has a
sufficient claim to reliability to be admitted2'0
While noting that this test might be criticized as too general to be of much
help, the court argued that in order to engage properly in its "gatekeeper" role
it must be sufficiently flexible to apply the appropriate standards in dissimilar
cases. 5 Thus, faced with a choice among the whole panoply of tests
discussed in this paper, the court, like the American and Canadian Supreme
Courts before it, opted for a flexible reliability test.3"s
D. The Law of Scientific Evidence in England
The use of scientific evidence in court has become a major public issue
in England, mainly because of the misuse of forensic science in the so-called
miscarriage of justice cases." 7 Unlike courts in the other countries surveyed
in this Article, English courts have not generally responded to the controversy
over the perceived misuse of forensic science by abandoning the traditional
liberal relevancy test in favor of stricter standards for the admissibility of
scientific evidence. While some English critics have called for courts to
tighten standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence, English reform
of the use of forensic science has focused on improving the forensic science
system itself.
1. English Law on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
The traditional position of English common law is that any witness
accredited as an expert may testify on the subject of her expertise."'
English commentators sporadically called on courts to adopt more stringent
standards for the admissibility of scientific evidence, but met with little
302. Id. at 4-6. The court refused to consider New Zealand precedents such as R. v. B. on the
ground that psychological evidence in child sex abuse cases is significantly different from physical forensic
evidence.
303. See infra text accompanying notes 322-27 for a discussion of Robb.
304. R. v. Calder, No. 154/94, at 7.
305. Id.
306. The court ultimately found that the proffered evidence was admissible. Id. at 2.
307. See infra notes 327-32 and accompanying text.
308. Peter Alldridge, Forensic Science and Expert Evidence, 21 J.L. & Soc'y 136, 144 (1994).
success.
309
In England and Wales, a court must decide whether a field of learning has
developed to such a point that a person of proper qualifications can give
testimony. The standards used for this determination are at the discretion of
each judge.310 Courts generally have not given a hard look at whether a
theory or technique that forms the basis for an expert's testimony is reliable,
or whether it is accepted in the relevant scientific community.3"' However,
the common law rule that a potential witness may testify as an expert only if
his testimony is not within the common knowledge of the jurors - enunciated
most clearly in R. v. Turner'1 2 - is largely intact, particularly with regard
to psychiatric and psychological testimony.3
In the late 1970s, Preece v. H.M. Advocate314 shattered faith in the
propriety of liberal rules for the admissibility of forensic evidence. The
government accused Preece of murdering a female hitchhiker.315 At trial,
the prosecution presented testimony by a scientist who had examined seminal
stains on the woman's pants and identified them as belonging to blood group
A. He also stated that Preece was of blood group A. The expert failed to
mention that the victim also had the same blood type and that the stains
probably included some of her secretions. The expert testified that he could
tell the difference between male and female secretions. However, his method
of doing so had never been reported in the scientific literature. This expert
had also provided other key scientific evidence linking Preece to the victim.
The jury convicted Preece. On appeal, the court overturned the conviction
after finding that the expert had not acted objectively and that all the evidence
he presented was suspect.31 6
309. E.g., R. Coleman& H. Walls, The Evaluation ofScientific Evidence, 1974 CRIM. L. REV. 276.
310. Peter Alldridge, Recognizing Novel Scientific Techniques: DNA As a Test Case, 1992 CRIM.
L. REV. 687, 692; Peter J. van Koppen, 3 EXPERT EVIDENCE, 46, 46 (1994) (reviewing J.F. Nijboer et
at. eds., FORENSIC EXPERTISE AND THE LAW OF EVIDENCE (1993)).
311. Freckelton, supra note 171, at 110; see also Mike Redmayne, The Royal Commission's
Proposals on Expert Evidence: A Critique, 2 EXPERT EVIDENCE 157, 161 (1994) ("The courts in England
and Wales have proved reluctant to develop any exclusionary rules of evidence to prevent 'junk' science
or cowboy experts from being heard in the courtroom.").
312. 1975 Q.B. 834, 841 (C.A.) ("If on the proven facts a judge or jury can form their own
conclusions without help, then the opinion of an expert is unnecessary. In such a case if it is given dressed
up in scientific jargon it may make judgment more difficult.").
313. This test has some influence in Canada and Australia as well. R. v. Mohan, [1994] 2 S.C.R.
9, 23-24 (citing Turner for proposition that expert psychiatric evidence must be helpful to jury); R. v.
Smith, 1992 V.R. 907 (holding that expert testimony regarding unreliability of identifications is
iiiadmissible because it probably would not assist jury more than thorough cautionary instruction from
judge).
One leading English academic expert on scientific evidence, Mike Redmayne, is not optimistic about
the future of the common knowledge test. He states that "Turner comes in for regular academic criticism,
and is slowly being undermined." E-mail from Mike Redmayne, Manchester University, to author (Sept.
21, 1995) (printed copy on file with author).
314. (H.C.J. June 19, 1981) (unreported opinion), recorded in 1981 CRIM. L. REV. 783.
315. For background on Preece, see Expert Evidence in Light ofPreece v. H.M. Advocate, 22 MED.
Sci. & L. 237 (1982); J.K. Mason, Expert Evidence in the Adversarial System of Criminal Justice, 26
MED. SCI. & L. 8, 9 (1986).
316. Preece, 1981 CRI. L. REV. 783. Further investigation revealed that the expert in question,
Dr. Alan Clift, had engaged in a wholly inappropriate pattern of advocacy in favor of the prosecution in
a series of cases. Clift was forced into early retirement. John Phillips, A Winter's Tale-"The Slings and
Arrows of Expert Evidence", 57 LAW INsT. J. 710. 710-11 (1983). A similar scandal in the United States
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Partly as a result of Preece, statutory law gives judges wide discretion to
exclude evidence, including expert testimony, in criminal cases. Under section
78 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984, a judge can refuse to
admit evidence if it appears from all the circumstances that its admission
would adversely affect the fairness of the proceedings. 7 Judges rarely
invoke this provision to exclude forensic evidence. 18
Some commentators began to call for the adoption of a Frye-like general
acceptance test. Authors of an English book on medicine and the law, for
example, argued that both Preece and the Australian Chamberlain1 9 cases
raise the Frye issue, which the authors call the issue of "the general
acceptability of scientific tests."32 The authors noted that prosecution
experts in Preece and Chamberlain relied on methodology that had not
withstood peer review. They suggested that a technique should be reported in
the scientific literature before it is acceptable to the courts, and that some
form of "established expertise" test may be desirable.32'
Preece does not, however, seem to have appreciably changed judicial
attitudes toward scientific evidence. One particularly significant (and
disturbing) case illustrating the laissez-faire approach of many English judges
is R. v. Robb.3" In Robb, the defendant argued on appeal that the trial court
erred in admitting expert testimony identifying his voice from tapes of
conversations. The defendant argued that the technique used "was worthless
and generally accepted by orthodox professional opinion as being so."
3 3
The expert himself agreed that the weight of informed opinion agreed that his
technique was unreliable?24 The defendant also objected that because the
expert had not set out the criteria he relied upon, there was no way to test the
accuracy of his conclusions.
The court nevertheless affirmed the trial court's admission of the
evidence, holding that neither general acceptance nor reliability is a
precondition to the admissibility of expert scientific testimony. The court
stated that it would not allow a "quack, a charlatan, or an enthusiastic
amateur" to testify.3" The court did add that the testimony is admissible if
the expert is qualified by academic training and practical experience, and able
to give testimony with a "value significantly greater than that of the ordinary
is discussed in In re Investigation of W. Va. State Police Crime Lab., 438 S.E.2d 501, 503-08 (W. Va.
1993).
317. D.J. GEE & J.K. MASON, THE COURTS AND THE DOCTOR 61 (1990).
318. But see William Brown, DNA Fingerprinting Back in the Dock, NEW Sci., March 6, 1993, at
14.
319. For a discussion of Chamberlain, see supra text accompanying notes 196-202.
320. GEE & MASON, supra note 317, at 154; see also M. MANSFIELD & T. WADDLE, PRESUMED
GUILTY 235-36 (1993) (expert evidence should be based only on professionally acceptable test).
321. Id.
322. 93 Crim. App. 161 (1991). But see PETER K. MCWILLIAMS, CANADIAN CRIMINAL EVIDENCE
9-30.2 (3d ed. 1994) (suggesting that this case involved expert testimony based more upon art than
science).
323. 93 Crim. App. at 165.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 166.
untutored layman."326
Robb may represent the last gasp of the extreme relevancy test. Recently,
courts have overturned a series of convictions in which the prosecution had
misused scientific evidence. The revelations that have accompanied these
decisions have led to widespread agitation in British legal circles for a stricter
test regarding the admission of scientific evidence. 27
The case that gathered the most attention involved the so-called
Birmingham Six. In 1975, a jury convicted six men in an IRA bombing of two
pubs. The government's forensic scientist had relied on the "Griess" test in
testifying that there was a ninety-nine percent probability that residues found
on the accuseds' hands were from nitroglycerine. It was later determined that
the "Griess" test is unreliable and that the residue could have been innocent
contamination from playing cards, adhesive tape, and certain soaps. After a
long campaign, the convictions were eventually overturned.328
Among other cases that attracted attention was the 1976 case, R. v.
Maguire, in which a jury convicted the "Maguire Seven" of illegally
possessing nitroglycerine. This conviction was also quashed many years later,
amid much criticism of the prosecution's failure to turn over scientific
evidence that tended to favor the defendants.329 Another miscarriage-of-
justice case involved Judith Ward, who was convicted in 1974 for murder and
for causing explosions likely to endanger life and property. The conviction
was quashed in June, 1991.330
In the aftermath of the Birmingham Six and Maguire Seven scandals, an
English legal reform group called "Justice," along with the Council for
Science and Society, established a task force to recommend improvements in
the way courts use forensic evidence in criminal trials. The final report made
two recommendations for screening scientific evidence. First, the report
suggested that courts should exercise caution "in accepting the results of a
method which has not been published and has not been subjected to the
scrutiny of other experts."331 The report then advised that courts check to
see whether an expert excluded alternative hypotheses.332 The report
explained that an observation may be compatible with an expert's conclusion,
but may also be compatible with an alternative explanation.
Another critic of English law on scientific evidence, Peter Alldridge of
Cardiff Law School, has stated flatly that "English law needs a test for the
admissibility of novel scientific evidence which considers the evidence itself
326. Id. This propostion can be traced back to R. v. Silverlock, 2 Q.B. 766, 771 (1894) (holding
expert need not have acquired skill "in the way of his business or in any definitive way").
327. These cases have also led to calls for improvement in criminal procedure. The possible options,
along with some specific recommendations, are discussed in ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST., THE ROLE
OF FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS 144-61 (1993).
328. R. v. McIlkenny, 93 Crim. App. 287 (1991).
329. R. v. Maguire, 1992 Q.B. 936.
330. R. v. Ward, 1 W.L.R. 619 (1993); see also CAROL A. JONES, EXPERT WITNESSEs: SCIENCE,
MEDICINE, AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW 3 (1994) (listing recent miscarriages of justice blamed on expert
testimony); Steven Greer, Miscarriages of Justice Reconsidered, 57 MOD. L. REV. 58, 71-72 (1994) (role
of forensic evidence in causing and correcting miscarriages); see generally Alldridge, supra note 308
(examining interrelationship of science, scientists, and evidence).
331. CHRISTOPHER ODDIE, SCIENCE AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 15 (1991).
332. Id.
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as well as the witness. "33 Another commentator who favors stricter scrutiny
of scientific evidence in England has argued that courts should focus on the
scientific reliability and relevance of expert testimony.334
Some commentators have predicted that in the aftermath of the successful
appeals of the Birmingham Six and others, English lawyers will persuade
courts to tighten their restrictions on expert testimony.33s There are signs
that English courts are indeed cracking down on suspect expert testimony in
the context of DNA evidence. 36 More generally, however, there seems to
be little movement toward stricter scrutiny of scientific evidence along the
lines of what has happened in the United States, and, to a lesser extent,
Australia and Canada.
2. Reforms of the Forensic Science System
Despite the lack of change in common law rules regarding scientific
evidence in England, there have been broader efforts to reform the forensic
science system. 337 First, there have been attempts and proposals to improve
the quality of forensic science laboratories through certification and otherwise.
The United Kingdom Royal Commission on Criminal Justice report notes that
the Forensic Science Service has instituted procedures to upgrade quality and
performance by its employees. For example, all significant results must be
checked by a colleague with appropriate experience. 33' The commission also
recommends that there occasionally be some sort of external audits, 339 and
that the government establish a new authority, the Forensic Science Advisory
Council (FSAC). The FSAC would investigate and report to the Home
Secretary on the "performance, achievements and efficiency" of forensic
science laboratories.340
The report recommends greater use of accreditation of scientific
laboratories under the National Measurement Accreditation Service. 41 This
333. Alldridge, supra note 310, at 698; see also Mike Redmayne, supra note 311, at 162 (arguing
that English courts could adopt rule for expert testimony similar to rule 403 of U.S. Federal Rules of
Evidence, which allows courts to exclude evidence whose prejudicial effect substantially outweighs its
probative value).
334. Editorial Introduction: Some Legal Issues Affecting Novel Forms of Expert Evidence, 1 EXPERT
EVIDENCE 79, 83 (1992) (arguing that courts should ensure reliability of expert testimony and its relevance
to particular questions court is considering).
335. See, e.g., D.J. Gee, The English Medical Witness - Why So Late?, 33 MED. Scm. L. 11, 11
(1993).
336.- See Brown, supra note 318, at 14 (discussing exclusion of DNA evidence in several cases). On
DNA evidence in England, see David J. Balding & Peter Donnelly, The Prosecutor's Fallacy and DNA
Evidence, 1994 CRdM. L. REV. 711; Peter Gill & Thomas Fedor, DNA Profiling: Is it Reliable?,
SoLIcrroRs' J., Expert Witnesses Supplement, Dec. 3, 1993, at 26; Andrew Hall, DNA Fingerprints:
Black Box or Black Hole?, 140 NEW L.J. 203 (1990); Patrick J. Lincoln, I Am in Blood. . ., 31 MED.
ScI. L. 277 (1992); McLeod, supra note 237; J. Suffian, DNA in the Courtroom, LEGAL ACTION, Feb.
1991, at 7..
337. A recent article regarding forensic science by the Lord Chief Justice, who is the head of the
criminal courts in England, discusses possible procedural reforms, but does not mention admissibility
standards at all. See Lord Taylor, The Lund Lecture, 35 MED. Scl. L. 3 (1995).
338. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST., supra note 327, at 149.
339.' Id.
340. Id. at 150-51.
341. Id. at 150; see also id. at 139 (noting lack of accreditation of experts).
is part of the National Physical Laboratory of the Department of Trade and
aims to establish national and international recognition of the competence of
accredited testing laboratories. The report adds that it might even be possible
for interpretations and opinions, not just scientific fact, to be accredited. The
entire process would be overseen by the FSAC. 42
The report also addresses the issue of the competence of forensic
scientists. It states that the main qualification should continue to be an
academic degree in the relevant scientific discipline. But the report adds that
the Royal Commission would welcome the development of specific
qualifications for forensic scientists since that could assist the courts in
assessing their competence as expert witnesses. In particular, the Commission
praised the National Council for Vocational Qualifications (of the Department
of Education) for its preliminary efforts toward establishing standards for
awarding qualifications to forensic scientists.343
Many reformers in the United Kingdom believe that a large percentage
of the problems that have arisen in the forensic science context are attributable
to the fact that English forensic science is almost solely the province of the
state. Government forensic scientists sometimes became partisan, and even if
they did not, their talents would continue to be available only to the
prosecution. Few Home Office and police scientists ever quit for private
practice, which leaves very few properly trained, experienced, and competent
forensic scientists from whom defendants can seek advice.3" Because of
these problems, the authors of the Justice Report, among other reform
advocates, argue that the government Forensic Science Service should be
changed into an "agency whose expertise is available equally to Prosecution
and Defence, and whose independence and efficiency are generally recognized
and respected by all.""
In 1991, the two forensic science departments that had been attached to
the police, the Forensic Science Service and the Metropolitan Police Forensic
Science Laboratory, were given executive agency status, which meant that
they could accept work from anyone, not just the police or the
prosecution." There has been little change of substance however, with the
only noticeable difference that the "police now pay for services on a case by
case basis rather than by annual subscription."347 Many defense solicitors
refuse to ask FSS scientists to be defense experts, either because they do not
trust FSS scientists to conceal defense investigations from prosecutors, or
342. Id. at 150.
343. Id.
344. Russell E. Stockdale, Running With the Hounds, 141 NEw L.J. 772, 772, 774 (1991).
345. ODDIE, supra note 331, at 43; see also Stockdale, supra note 344, at 773 (arguing for
independent Forensic Science Service).
346. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JusT., supra note 327, at 71; Alldridge, supra note 308, at 139.
Several Australian states have already taken steps to ensure the neutrality of their forensic laboratories.
In South Australia, the State Forensic Science Centre is independent of the police force and undertakes
scientific examinations for both the police and the defense. In Victoria, the State Forensic Science
Laboratory is within the police department, but has a philosophy of nonpartisanship. The New South Wales
Institute of Forensic Medicine is stressing a greater degree of independence from the police than in the
past, but has to overcome entrenched attitudes developed by the adversarial system. BROWN & WILSON,
supra note 203, at 16-17.
347. Alldridge, supra note 308, at 139.
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because their clients object to "police evidence."34 Moreover, the FSS
scientists too frequently refuse to acknowledge that their work is
controversial, and continue to act in an adversarial manner. According to the
Royal Commission, forensic scientists are not always aware that their methods
and conclusions may be controversial in broader scientific circles. 49 Some
forensic scientists believe that it is not their job to draw out the limitations of
prosecution evidence, but rather the responsibility of the defense.350
Observers of the British justice system generally agree that the changes
in the status of the Forensic Science Service and the Metropolitan Police
Forensic Science Laboratory have had at best a marginal impact on resolving
problems associated with state domination of forensic science in England.
Alldridge cites the following concerns: (1) "it has been difficult to secure
defense access to scientific evidence"; and (2) defendants often are not
properly funded by legal aid and are therefore unable to hire forensic
scientists to carry out whatever checks are necessary. 351' A House of Lords
report, meanwhile, identifies the following problems: (1) rationing of police
analysis because of budget constraints; (2) "cowboy" private practitioners; (3)
fragmentation of analysis; (4) cuts in investment activities by the Forensic
Science Services; and (5) the increasing inability of defendants to afford
forensic science services.352
Similarly, the Royal Commission noted that defense forensic experts are
in short supply, and it is difficult to judge the competence of such
experts. 3  Another problem defense counsel face is that the government,
which has access to the forensic evidence first, is able to frame the forensic
debate.354 By the time defense lawyers are in a position to conduct their
investigations, crime scenes have often been disturbed; exhibits lost, damaged,
or destroyed in testing; and the opportunity to examine victims or assailants
may no longer be available. Evidence relevant to the defense case may not
even be collected or noticed by prosecution authorities whose principal
concern is to secure incriminating evidence.355
Some of these problems - like the fact that it is the prosecution that
frames the debate and has initial access to the forensic evidence - are
probably insoluble. But one scholar argues that many of the other problems
can be solved through "the establishment of a wholly independent forensic
science service, appropriately publicly funded, available to all, the scientists
available to be called as court witnesses, their material and results to be
348. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JUsT., supra note 327, at 139.
349. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRrM. JUST., supra note 327, at 137.
350. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST., supra note 327, at 138; see also JoNES, supra note 330, at
3 ("Impartial forensic science has come to mean state science.").
351. Alldridge, supra note 308, at 140.
352. Alec Samuels, Forensic Science and Miscarriages ofJustice, 34 MED. ScI. L. 148, 152 (1994).
353. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRUM. JusT., supra note 327, at 149, 155. The Commission notes: "There
appears to be no comprehensive information available on the number of firms offering fforensic]
services .... Our impression is that the number of fully qualified scientists engaged in this work in the
private sector is limited by the scope for remuneration under current arrangements for legal aid. Moreover,
laboratory facilities in the private sector are limited .... It is, however, possible for defense scientists
to use the facilities of public sector laboratories . . . ." Id. at 146.
354. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST., supra note 327, at 139.
355. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRIM. JUST., supra note 327, at 140.
available to both prosecution and defence."356 The Royal Commission,
meanwhile, recommended
where scientific evidence is in the hands of the prosecution and where a suspect has been
charged and is legally represented, that the defence should have an enforceable right to
observe any further scientific tests conducted on it or, unless the material exists only in
minute quantities, the right to remove some of the material... so that tests can be carried
out by defence scientific experts.3"
IV. LESSONS
Much of the debate over scientific evidence in the United States has been
undertaken by those with an ideological or pecuniary interest in the subject.
Conservatives upset with the perceived litigation explosion and its effect on
corporate liability, evidence scholars who disfavor juries, corporate defense
counsel, and criminal defense attorneys generally argue for stricter standards
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Liberals who favor expansive
liability for corporations, scholars who embrace the jury system, plaintiffs'
attorneys, and prosecutors generally argue for more liberal standards. By
studying the controversies surrounding scientific evidence in other common
law countries, Americans can relinquish their ideological and other baggage
and gain insight into some of the unanswered questions that plague our own
debate. For example, is the use of unreliable scientific evidence, or the
misuse of potentially reliable scientific evidence, truly an important factor in
American litigation? If so, are juries able and willing to distinguish junk
science from sound scientific evidence? If juries are not willing and able to
do so, what legal rules, if any, can be established that would exclude bad
scientific evidence from trial, while still allowing parties to admit valid
scientific evidence?
A. The Junk Science Problem is Real
Perhaps no issue has stirred as much rancor among evidence and torts
scholars as the controversy over the scope of the junk science problem in
American courtrooms. Ever since the publication of Peter Huber's Galileo's
Revenge in 1991, debate has raged over Huber's thesis that plaintiffs'
attorneys routinely use eccentric, incompetent, or corrupt experts to
bamboozle juries into awarding huge damages to plaintiffs whose claims are
not supported by valid scientific evidence.
Some of Huber's most vociferous critics deny that the junk science
problem exists. Despite the widespread condemnation by American legal
scholars of the prevalence of junk science in the criminal context, 358 some
critics imply that wealthy corporate defendants devised the junk science debate
by buying influence at the Manhattan Institute (Huber's employer) and other
356. Samuels, supra note 352, at 153.
357. ROYAL COMM'N ON CRlM. JusT., supra note 327, at 155.
358. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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"right-wing" think tanks. The alleged goal is to prevent injured plaintiffs
relying on scientific evidence from emerging victorious in toxic tort
litigation. 59
If Huber's critics are correct, and the junk science problem is largely a
mirage conjured up by selfish special interests seeking to avoid tort liability,
one would expect that among common law nations criticism of junk science
in the courts would be limited to the United States. Other common law legal
systems, including those of England, Canada, and Australia, do not have
anywhere near the enormous volume of tort litigation present in the United
States. 6 As a result, those countries do not have corporate-funded tort
reform groups of the sort that Huber's critics blame for the movement toward
stricter scrutiny of scientific evidence in the United States. Moreover, toxic
tort cases, the focus of Huber's book, are almost unknown outside the United
States.
361
Yet, as we have seen, contrary to the implications of the work of some
of Huber's critics, there has been a growing chorus of criticism of the quality
and veracity of scientific expert testimony in other common law countries.
Unlike in the United States, where the primary opposition to junk science has
come from tort reformers concerned about the perceived explosion in tort
liability, the junk science controversy abroad is primarily limited to debate
over the perceived misuse of scientific evidence by prosecutors in criminal
cases such as Preece and Chamberlain.362
B. Juries Are Not Competent to Decide Complex Scientific Issues
Most evidence and tort scholars acknowledge that there are at least
occasional problems with the use of scientific evidence in American courts.
Many of them believe that the problem is a minimal one that can be resolved
359. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Chesebro, Galileo's Retort: Peter Huber's Junk Scholarship, 42 AM. U.
L. REV. 1637, 1705-22 (1993); Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, Toxic Torts, Causation, and Scientific Evidence
After Daubert, 55 U. PrTT. L. REV. 889, 946 n.322 (1994); Lewin, supra note 62, at 192.
360. See generally JOHN G. FLEMING, THE AMERICAN TORT PROCESS (1988) (comparing U.S. tort
system with tort law of other common law nations).
361. Such suits are sufficiently rare that articles written by Commonwealth legal scholars about toxic
tort law either cite American cases almost exclusively or indulge in speculation regarding future toxic tort
litigation in their countries. See Edward K. Christie, Toxic Tort Disputes: Proof of Causation and the
Courts, 22 ENVTL. PLAN. & L.J. 302, 315-16 (1992); Edward K. Christie, Toxic Tort Disputes:
Distinctive Characteristics Require Special Preparation for Trial, 22 QUEENSL. L. Soc'Y J. 279 (1992);
Charles Pugh & Valerie Easty, Toxic Torts and Group Actions, 143 NEW L.J. 1293, 1293 (1993); Neo
J. Tuytel, The Prospects for Asbestos and Other Toxic Tort Litigation in Canada: A British Columbia
Perspective, 2 CAN. INS. L. REV. 181 (1991).
362. The use of questionable medical testimony in civil litigation, however, has received some
attention, particularly in Australia. See, e.g., K.H. Marks, The Interventionist Court and Procedure, 18
MONASH U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1992) ("Under our system, the court may be deprived of opinion which gives
real assistance to it in deciding the question. In the personal injuries field we have witnessed many medical
experts who are full time on hire as expert witnesses and who do not otherwise practice medicine.");
Margaret Lyons, Jury Stays Out on Expert Witnesses, Bus. REV. WKLY., Nov. 29, 1991, at 59 (discussing
misuse of experts in Australia); Peter Walsh, Australia: The Slippery Slope to Litigation Lunacy, AUSTL.
FIN. REV., Aug. 20, 1991, at 13 (expressing concern that Australia may be following United States down
slippery slope). The consensus, however, seems to be that the absence of contingency fees and other
incentives for speculative litigation has shielded Australia from much of the junk science that has been
introduced into American courtrooms in civil cases. Lyons, supra.
through minor tinkering with the rules of evidence and procedure. Others
believe that junk science is a major problem caused largely by the inability of
lay juries to separate good science from bad science. Huber is the most
prominent member of the latter group.
Huber's attack on juries' competence to comprehend scientific evidence
is a consistent theme throughout Galileo's Revenge,"3 and is particularly
apparent in the concluding chapters. Huber expresses dismay about the
fallibility of "a thousand juries scattered across the country grappling with the
complexities of immune system impairment."" Later, he complains that
courts allow "random panels of jurors ... to decide scientific truth by
majority vote."365 He also unfavorably compares a system that "invite[s]
random groups of twelve stout citizens to vote as they please" to the rigors
of the scientific process.366
In perhaps the most influential passages of his book, Huber argues that
judges should prevent jury verdicts based on junk science by screening
proffered scientific evidence before trial to ensure that only reliable, generally
accepted scientific evidence is presented to juries.367 Other scholars and
attorneys echo Huber's concerns about jury competence and, like him, call for
stricter pretrial screening of scientific evidence to prevent juries from relying
on bad science in making their decisions."',
Prominent critics of Huber, including Ronald Allen,369  Kenneth
Chesebro,37  Jean Macchiaroli Eggen,37  Michael Green,3" Edward
Imwinkelried,373 Michael Jacobs,374 Neil Vidmar,375 and Judge Jack
363. Indeed, when Galileo's Revenge was still a work-in-progress, Huber published an article with
the suggestive title of "Junk Science and the Jury." Peter W. Huber, Junk Science and the Jury, 1990 U.
CI. LEGAL F. 273.
364. HUBER, supra note 4, at 201.
365. HUBER, supra note 4, at 218.
366. HUBER, supra note 4, at 228.
367. HUBER, supra note 4, at 200-02. For example, the Ninth Circuit relied on this part of Galileo's
Revenge in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 951 F.2d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 1991), vacated and
remanded, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
368. See Black, supra note 15, at 787 (contending that judges are in better position than jurors to
resolve scientific disputes); David L. Faigman, A Response to Professor Carlson: Struggling to Stop the
Flood of Unreliable Expert Testimony, 76 MINN. L. REV. 877, 889 (1992) (insisting that jurors should be
insulated from hazards of junk science); Lee Loevinger, Science and Legal Rules of Evidence: A Review
of Galileo's Revenge: Junk Science in the Courtroom, 32 JuRIMErRICS J. 487 (1992); Book Note, Rebel
Without A Cause, 105 HARV. L. REv. 935 (1992) (accepting Huber's thesis that liberal admissibility rules
lead to jury verdicts based on junk science). Moreover, Huber's thesis finds support in some older articles,
such as Kenneth K. Sereno, Source Credibility, 28 J. FORENSIC Sci. 532, 534-35 (1983) (arguing that
jurors are inclined to focus on expert's presentational style rather than on substance of expert's testimony).
369. Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Daubert Decision, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1157,
1159 (1994); Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of Experts: Deference or
Education?, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 1131, 1143-44 (1993) ("[Huber's] argument also assumes thatjudges are
better equipped than jurors to make determinations of scientific consensus, or presumably to decide when
scientific consensus need not be given deference. This is a popular myth these days, but we know of no
good reason to adopt it uncritically.").
370. Chesebro, supra note 359, at 1652-54, 1722.
371. Eggen, supra note 359, at 946 n.322.
372. Michael Green, Relief at the Fryeing of Frye: Reflections on Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, I SHEPARD'S EXPERT & Sc. EVIDENCE Q. 43, 48 (1993).
373. Edward J. Imwinkelried, Attempts to Limit the Scope of the Frye Standard for the Admission
of Scientific Evidence: Confronting the Real Cost of the General Acceptance Test, 10 BEHAVIORAL SC.
& L. 441, 445, 453-54 (1992) (expressing confidence in ability ofjurors to comprehend expert testimony);
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Weinstein376 argue that juries are generally able to comprehend complex
scientific evidence and to make reasonable decisions based on the evidence
presented. The consensus among these scholars is that minor tinkering with
the traditional liberal rules governing the admissibility of scientific evidence
will correct the few problems that arise.
The debate between Huber and his allies and their critics regarding jury
competence is especially important after Daubert. Daubert is sufficiently
ambiguous that both sides of the debate claim the opinion as a victory.
Michael Green, for example, argues that the Daubert court "delivered a
rebuke to much of the jury bashing that has become voguish of late." 3"
Huber, in contrast, writes that "what Daubert stands for is that judges have
a major role to play in distinguishing accurate, reliable, science from untested
speculation, transparent error, or outright fraud."37' Perceptions regarding
jury competence, and therefore the scope of the junk science porblem, are
likely to play a large role in determining how strictly courts interpret Daubert.
The only way to definitively settle the debate regarding the scope of the
junk science problem in tort and criminal law would be to gather data on its
prevalence. But it is not at all clear how to gather and interpret such
information. Perhaps this explains why Huber's critics have not contradicted
his thesis with empirical evidence. 9
Nor have Huber's critics presented data showing that lay juries succeed
in resolving scientific disputes. Professor Joseph Sanders has noted that
"[g]iven the intensity of opinion on jury competence, the amount of systematic
information is surprisingly limited." 8' The most comprehensive study to
date of jury decisionmaking in complex cases casts doubt on whether jurors
are able to understand complex evidence and implies that jurors simply ignore
much of the expert testimony presented to them.3"' This study, however, is
not definitive.
Another way to assess jury competence in cases involving complex
scientific evidence is to turn to comparative law. If scholars in other common
Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision on the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: The Supreme
Court Chooses the Right Piece for All the Evidentiary Puzzles, 9 ST. JOHN'S J.L. COMM. 5, 22 (1993)
[hereinafter lmwinkelried, The Daubert Decision].
374. Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About Scientific Evidence:
A Closer Look at Juror "Incompetence" and Scientific "Objectivity", 25 CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1090,
1094-98 (1993).
375. Neil Vidmar, Are Juries Competent to Decide Liability in Tort Cases Involving
Scientific/Medical Issues? Some Data from Medical Malpractice, 43 EMORY L.J. 885, 886-87 (1994).
376. Jack B. Weinstein, Procedural Reform as a Surrogate for Substantive Law Revision, 59 BROOK.
L. REV. 827, 835 (1993).
377. Green, supra note 372, at 48.
378. David E. Bernstein & Peter W. Huber, Defense Perspective, 1 SHEPARD'S EXPERT & SCI.
EVIDENCE Q. 59, 62 (1993).
379. See Lewin, supra note 62 (attacking Huber for not providing empirical data regarding scope
of junk science problem). Se generally Imwinkelried, The Daubert Decision, supra note 373, at 22
(criticizing Huber for failing to present data regarding jury incompetence); Jacobs, supra note 374, at 1090
(same). None of these critics have provided data of their own.
380. Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causation in the Bendectin Cases,
46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 79 n.376 (1993).
381. SPECIAL COMM. ON JURY COMPREHENSION OF THE ABA SEC. OF Lmo., JURY
COMPREHENSION IN COMPLEX CASES (1989).
law nations perceive the same problems with the effect of scientific evidence
on juries in their countries as Huber and his allies do in the United States, this
would be strong evidence that Huber's broad thesis is correct. Specifically,
if the prevalence of dubious scientific evidence is related to the inability of
juries to properly interpret scientific evidence, one would expect that scholars
in other common law countries would perceive a similar problem. One would
also expect that the perceived junk science problem would be far less
significant in contexts where juries are not used.
As this Article has demonstrated, the growing misuse of scientific
evidence in the courtroom, particularly in jury trials, is indeed well
recognized throughout the common law world. Commonwealth commentators
join American critics of junk science in asserting that lay juries are not
competent to weed out dubious scientific testimony.382
As discussed above," 3 in Australia and England the misuse of scientific
evidence came to public attention as a result of several well publicized trials
in which defendants were unjustly convicted after the prosecution presented
unreliable scientific evidence to the jury. The British government established
a Royal Commission on Criminal Justice to investigate British cases involving
the misuse of scientific evidence to obtain criminal convictions. According to
one participant in the Commission's work, the Commission based its final
recommendations on two propositions: first, that a trial is not the best place
for scientific disputation; and second, that a lay jury is not equipped to settle
scientific disagreements among experts. 34 Both of these propositions mimic
the concerns of Huber and other American critics of junk science.38 5
In Australia, in addition to Splatt and Chamberlain, a remarkable number
of convictions have attracted controversy because of suspicions that the
scientific evidence supporting the convictions was not sound.3"6 Australian
commentators have argued that these cases reveal that juries have trouble
interpreting scientific evidence. By 1992, Peter McGauran, a member of
Parliament and the Shadow Minister for Science and Technology, found a
"growing debate as to the preparedness of the jury system to absorb and
critically assess forensic evidence. "37 The Chief Justice of the Australian
Capital Territory Supreme Court, for example, asked rhetorically:
How can lay decision-makers in a matter of days or weeks, and based on the limited
information put before them, without transcripts of evidence and often enough without
copies of experts' reports, resolve disagreements between people who have spent a lifetime
reading, studying and acquiring expertise within their respective fields of knowledge?
3"
382. See infra text accompanying notes 384-89.
383. See supra text accompanying notes 194-205, 314-17.
384. Paul Roberts, Forensic Science Evidence After Runciman, 1994 CRIM. L. REV. 780, 785.
385. See generally HUBER, supra note 4 (contending that courts should screen scientific evidence
before allowing it to be presented to juries and should defer to weight of mainstream scientific opinion
when engaging in such screening).
386. See Bourke, supra note 194 at 134-39 (reviewing a number of these cases).
387. McGauran, supra note 203, at 84.
388. Jeffrey Miles, Forensic Science: In the Spotlight or Under the Microscope, 23 AUSTL. J.
FORENsIC Sci. 3, 3 (1991). Dean C.R. Williams of Monash University Law School, meanwhile, found
that the miscarriage of justice cases created "serious doubt as to the capacity of juries to cope with
conflicts of expert evidence." Williams, supra note 199. Ian R. Freckelton argues that the primary issue
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In Canada, the misuse of scientific evidence in the courtroom has not
become a public issue. Canadian attorneys and jurists, however, are aware of
the problems that arise when lay jurors are required to decide cases based on
complex scientific evidence. The Canadian Supreme Court recently expressed
its concern over the potential misuse of scientific evidence in criminal trials:
There is a danger that expert evidence will be misused and will distort the fact-finding
process. Dressed up in scientific language which the jury does not easily understand and
submitted through a witness of impressive antecedents, this evidence is apt to be accepted
by the jury as being virtually infallible and as having more weight than it deserves?"
As evidenced by the attention given the subject in England, Canada, and
Australia, the problem of junk science in court is endemic to common law
legal systems, at least when juries are used as triers of fact. Thus, Huber's
views that jury incompetence plays a major role in the junk science problem,
and that a potential junk science problem is present whenever juries are asked
to resolve a scientific dispute, are supported by evidence from common law
jurisdictions outside the United States.
C. Tightening the Rules for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Is a
Second-Best Solution to the Problem of Junk Science in Tort
As we have seen, concern over the problem of the misuse of scientific
evidence in adversarial litigation is by no means limited to conservative critics
of the American tort system such as Peter Huber. Rather, judges and legal
scholars in England, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand all recognize that
scientific evidence can be, and has been, abused in the adversarial process,
and that juries often do not recognize these abuses. In all of these countries,
debate rages among courts and commentators over the extent to which the
rules of evidence should be modified to assure that the scientific evidence
presented to juries is trustworthy.
Huber identifies two causes of the junk science problem in the American
tort system: "Junk science is impelled through our courts by a mix of
opportunity and incentive. 'Let-it-all-in' legal theory creates the opportunity.
The incentive is money: the prospect that the Midas-like touch of a credulous
jury will now and again transform scientific dust into gold."39' Junk science,
then, is a problem because courts permit plaintiffs to submit dubious theories
of causation to a jury, and because juries too often believe these theories.
There are, therefore, two possible explanations for the relative dearth of
junk science-based tort cases in the Commonwealth. The first is that there is
less opportunity to introduce dubious evidence in Commonwealth courts
regarding scientific evidence is "how much can we realistically ask randomly selected, lay representatives
of the community to do in their capacity as jurors?" Freckelton, supra note 213, at 14. More recently,
Freckelton has concluded that "juries are singularly inequipped to decide what ideally would be decided
in laboratories and the halls of academia." Letter from Ian Freckelton, Australian evidence scholar, to
author (July 4, 1995) (on file with author); cf. Simuels, supra note 174, at 3 (arguing that use of juries
in cases involving scientific evidence does not create "an unacceptable level of injustice").
389. R. v. Mohan, 89 C.C.C.3d 402, 411 (1994).
390. HuBER, supra note 4, at 3.
because they apply stricter rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence
than do American courts. The second possibility is that Commonwealth
attorneys have less economic incentive to engage in speculative litigation.
Huber and other American critics of junk science have focused their
efforts on restricting the opportunity for junk science litigation by encouraging
courts to engage in stricter pretrial scrutiny of scientific evidence.391 Stricter
rules for the admissibility of scientific evidence can reduce the use of junk
science, but experience since Daubert has shown that junk science can coexist
with such rules. Relying on judges to screen scientific evidence before trial
means relying on courts to be conscientious and competent. While there are
good reasons for believing that judges are generally more competent than
juries at resolving scientific issues,392 judges are by no means perfect.
Moreover, judges, particularly elected judges at the state level, are not
immune from the same pro-plaintiff and antidefendant prejudices that often
affect juries.
393
Comparing American and Commonwealth experience with junk science
in tort suggests that restricting opportunity through strict rules for the
admissibility of scientific evidence is a less effective means of eliminating
junk science than restricting incentive. Unlike in the United States, junk
science is not considered a serious problem in tort cases in the Commonwealth
(although there is some concern about expert medical testimony in civil cases,
particularly in Australia).394 Remarkably, a recent four volume Australian
treatise on comparative scientific evidence barely touches on tort cases.3 95
This dearth of junk science in tort cases in the Commonwealth is not a
result of strict standards for the admissibility of- scientific evidence.
Commonwealth attorneys actually have greater opportunities than their
American counterparts to present junk science evidence to a trier of fact. As
demonstrated in Part III of this Article, at all relevant times the rules for the
admissibility of scientific evidence in England, Canada, and Australia have
been at least as liberal, and sometimes far more liberal, than the rules for the
admissibility of scientific evidence in the United ,States. In fact, because tort
cases in the Commonwealth are heard by judges, not juries, civil defendants
rarely challenge the admissibility of scientific evidence. If the evidence is
meritless, courts simply assign no weight to it.
While not lacking the opportunity, Commonwealth attorneys do lack the
incentive to bring speculative lawsuits based on dubious science. It is far
easier and potentially vastly more profitable for both the attorney and her
client to bring a tort action in the Unites States than in other common law
jurisdictions. Potential toxic tort plaintiffs outside the United States have a
host of disadvantages relative to American plaintiffs. First, and perhaps most
391. But cf. Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort
System Outcomes Are Principally Determined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1755
(1994) (arguing junk science problem in United States should be resolved by restricting contingency fees,
thereby reducing plaintiffs' attorneys' incentives to bring cases based on dubious scientific evidence).
392. See Sanders, supra note 380, at 82 (discussing reasons judges are more competent than juries).
393. See RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS 26-27 (1988) (arguing that state judges
are under political pressure to redistribute money from out-of-state corporations to in-state plaintiffs).
394. See supra note 362.
395. EXPERT EVIDENCE, supra note 228.
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important, is the paucity of civil jury trials outside the United States.
39 6
As noted previously, the biggest problem with lay juries deciding toxic
tort cases is that they frequently do not comprehend the evidence put before
them. 97 That aside, the use of juries inherently encourages speculative tort
litigation.
First, jury trials lead to wildly inconsistent verdicts, particularly when
complex scientific issues are involved.398 Moreover, because jury verdicts
have no precedential value, even a tort defendant who has won a string of
victories may not be able to achieve final victory on an issue. 39 9 Plaintiffs'
attorneys in the United States find that it is profitable to bring the same
dubious multimillion dollar claim before many juries in the expectation that
a few random victories will more than compensate for a larger number of
losses. In contrast, in England, Canada, or Australia, once a court issues a
thoughtful decision rejecting a dubious scientific claim, other courts will
respect that judgment, thus bringing the litigation to a quick end.4°° Juries,
moreover, tend to award much higher damages than do judges, adding to
American plaintiffs' incentives to litigate questionable claims.
Given the constitutional basis of civil jury trials4"' and populist
sentiment favoring juries, it seems highly unlikely that the United States will
follow its sister common law jurisdictions and abolish civil juries.4 2 Putting
the jury issue aside, plaintiffs in Commonwealth legal systems have the
following additional disadvantages relative to American plaintiffs:
* contingency fees are generally prohibited;
* the "English" fee-shifting rule prevails;
* joint and several liability is usually unavailable;
* awards for lost earning capacity, pain and suffering, and loss of
enjoyment of life are meager;
396.' FLEMING, supra note 360, at 101.
397. See, e.g., Sanders, supra note 380, at 5-12, 45 (documenting lack of jury comprehension in
Bendectin cases).
398. E.g., PHANTOM RISK, supra note 33, at 138-41.
399. For example, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, manufacturer of the morning sickness drug
Bendectin, has been defending its product from lawsuits alleging that it causes birth defects for almost
twenty years. Despite the fact that Merrell Dow has emerged victorious in dozens of cases, and has not
paid plaintiffs' attorneys a cent, the litigation continues.
400. For example, in Rothwell v. Raes, 76 D.L.R.4th 280 (Ont. Ct. App. 1990), the court upheld
the trial court's decision favoring the defendant in a case alleging brain damage from a pertussis (whooping
cough) vaccine. The court held that the mere possibility that the vaccine caused an injury does not amount
to the probability necessary to sustain a plaintiff's verdict. Similarly, an English court rejected a claim
linking a pertussis vaccine to brain damage in 1988. Loveday v, Renton, THE TIMEs, 31 Mar. 1988
(available on LEXIS, Enggen file); see D. Hull, Pediatrics, in A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO MEDICINE AND
THE LAW 199, 207 (J.P. Jackson ed., 1991). John Fleming points out that in the United States
"[clonsistency and uniformity, as ideals of equal justice, are not valued to the same degree as they are in
England and many other countries. The very latitude inevitable in jury assessment of damages prompted
English courts to abjure even occasional 'spot' jury trial, in the belief that the consistencey attained by
professional judges encourages settlements and avoids the American inflation of awards." FLEMING, supra
note 360, at 125.
401. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VII.
402. It is, however, entirely possible that legislatures will continue to limit jury discretion on
subsidiary issues by, for example, continuing to impose caps on certain types of damages and restricting
punitive damage awards.
* punitive damage awards are rarer and smaller than in the United
States.
4o3
The most effective way that the United States could significantly reduce
litigation based on junk science would be to restrict the financial incentives to
bring such cases by. adopting all or some of these rules.' Tort reform must
stand or fall on its overall merits. But a reduction of lawsuits based on junk
science is a potentially large benefit to be weighed against the potential costs.
D. Tightening the Rules for the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Will Not
Solve the Junk Science Problem in Criminal Cases; Broader Reforms are
Needed
As we have seen, courts in Canada and Australia have been trying to
crack down on junk science in criminal cases by slowly tightening the rules
for the admissibility of scientific evidence. In England, however, there has
been very little movement toward stricter standards for admitting scientific
evidence. Instead, English reformers have largely focused on broader reforms
to improve the quality of the scientific evidence used in court.
The enacted and proposed English reforms are a better solution to the
junk science problem in criminal cases than stricter rules for the admissibility
of scientific evidence. Challenging the admissibility of scientific evidence
requires a competent attorney who recognizes that the evidence proffered by
the prosecution is potentially excludable. Successfully challenging dubious
testimony requires ample resources, both to comprehend the underlying
scientific debate and effectively to explain why the proffered evidence does
not meet appropriate standards. In many cases, a defendant needs to hire his
own expert to launch a successful challenge. In practice, however, many
criminal defendants are impoverished and must rely on legal aid provided by
the state. Unfortunately, some legal aid attorneys are not competent; even
those who are competent may not be given sufficient resources by the state to
launch a successful challenge to junk science proffered by the prosecution.
While stricter standards for admitting scientific evidence benefit only
those who can afford to mount an effective legal challenge to questionable
scientific evidence, broader reforms benefit even the most impecunious
defendants. Of course, there is no reason a jurisdiction could not have what
may amount to the best of both worlds - English-style broad reform of the
forensic science system and stricter rules for the admissibility of scientific
evidence.
403. See INDUSTRY COMM'N, REPORT No. 4: PRODUCT LIABILITY 117-19 (July 18, 1990)
(discussing factors in United States judicial system that tend to inflate damages awards). England has
recently allowed "no-win, no-fee," contracts. Unlike American contingency fees, remuneration of English
plaintiffs' attorneys' fees are restricted to double their usual fee. Britain's Antiquated Courts, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 16, 1995, at 20.
404. The combination of these rules and the absence of jury trials has been extremely effective in
curbing toxic tort litigation in the Commonwealth. See supra note 361 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
While this Article may encourage Americans to wrestle with the
implications of the Commonwealth experience with scientific evidence,
Commonwealth courts seem slowly to be "Americanizing" their admissibility
rules regarding scientific evidence. A tentative consensus is emerging among
Commonwealth judges that it is their duty to exclude dubious expert testimony
before trial. Most Commonwealth legal scholars applaud this trend, and the
analysis presented in this Article suggests that there are sound reasons behind
it.
No one would deny that the general acceptance test, the reliability test,
and every other test that has been devised to screen scientific evidence create
problems of their own, not the least of which is the problem of judicial
competence in enforcing them. The adoption of admissibility rules such as
general acceptance or reliability does not guarantee that courts will stop
admitting scientifically dubious evidence.
The fact that a foolproof rule for admitting scientific evidence cannot be
devised does not mean that courts should decline to apply rules that will
improve the system. Adoption of the general acceptance or reliability test is
not a panacea. Enforcement of such rules, however, can help ensure that the
lives, liberty, and property of future Preeces, Chamberlains, and Merrell
Dows are not put in jeopardy by the presentation of unreliable scientific
evidence to befuddled lay jurors.
